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Background
The United States is in the midst of an opioid misuse epidemic involving 
prescription drugs, as well as heroin and other synthetic opioids (e.g., 
fentanyl). This crisis has led to increases in drug overdose deaths, 
admissions for substance use treatment, and neonatal abstinence syndrome. 
Deaths caused by drug overdoses increased from 6.2 per 100,000 in 2000 
to 14.7 per 100,000 in 2014, and admissions to substance-use treatment 
facilities increased from <1 per 10,000 in 1999 to approximately 4 per 
10,000 in 2009.1,2 In addition, the incidence of neonatal abstinence 
syndrome increased from 1.5 per 1,000 births in 1999 to 6.0 per 1,000 
births in 2013.3 
In 2014, an estimated 1.9 million persons had substance use disorders 
involving prescription pain relievers, and 586,000 persons had substance 
use disorders involving heroin.4 Precise data on the number of people who 
inject drugs (PWID) in the United States is lacking; however, estimates for 
the numbers of PWID in 2011 ranged from 500,000 to 1 million persons.5 
In addition, the prevalence of injection drug use has increased; heroin 
injection increased 63% during 2002–2013.6 Part of the increase in injection 
drug use stems from prescription opioid abuse: 4 of 5 new heroin users 
started by misusing prescription opioids.7 Prescription opioid abuse is 
contributing to increases in drug injection in communities not previously 
considered at high risk of injection-related infections. 
The opioid epidemic has also increased the number of PWID in the United 
States and thereby substantially increased the risk of transmission of blood-
borne viruses, including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis C 
virus (HCV) and hepatitis B virus (HBV) through use of shared equipment. 
Unsafe injection of drugs, such as by sharing injection equipment (e.g., 
syringes, cookers, water, and cotton) to inject or split drugs, contributed 
to an increase in new HCV infections from 1,232 to 2,436 from 2011 
through 2015.8 Although PWID make up 1%–3% of the total population, 
injection drug use accounted for approximately 6% of new HIV diagnoses 
in 2015; infections attributable to the combined risk of male-to-male sexual 
contact and injection drug use accounted for another 3% of diagnoses.5,9 
Among persons diagnosed with acute HCV infection and information about 
injection drug use in 2015, 64% were PWID.8 
Rural communities are disproportionately affected by the opioid epidemic 
and have been most affected by overdoses, new acute HCV infections, 
and are considered most vulnerable to rapid spread of HIV and HCV 
if introduced among uninfected communities of PWID.10 Identifying 
jurisdictions particularly vulnerable to an HIV or HCV outbreak can guide 
public health efforts to detect, prevent, and respond quickly to, potential 
outbreaks. Although numbers and rates of acute hepatitis C infections are 
proportionally greater in rural communities, significant increases have also 
been recorded in urban counties.11–16 
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The potential for rapid spread of HIV among this new population of PWID 
was realized during a 2015 outbreak in rural Scott County, Indiana. In 
January 2015, disease intervention specialists (DIS) reported 11 new cases 
of confirmed HIV infection epidemiologically linked through injection 
drug use; by comparison, only 5 HIV infections had been diagnosed in this 
county in the prior 10 years (2004–2013).17 By November 2015, 181 new 
cases of HIV had been diagnosed; 92% of infected persons were coinfected 
with HCV. The impact of injection drug use can be far reaching, and PWID 
have a wide range of needs that may complicate their ability to follow the 
treatment and prevention recommendations essential to controlling an 
outbreak. Lack of medical care capacity for HIV and HCV infection as well 
as limited local resources for prevention and treatment of substance use 
disorder may have allowed this outbreak to spread faster and further than 
it would have had these resources been present.17 Controlling the outbreak 
involved establishing these services, especially provision of antiretroviral 
therapy for HIV infection. Additional activities that further aided control 
included use of advanced HIV and HCV molecular technologies to 
characterize the network of PWID, rapid deployment of DIS teams to 
conduct contact tracing and HIV and HCV testing throughout the affected 
community, and use of the state’s emergency preparedness resources to 
coordinate a multitude of other services (e.g., insurance enrollment, care 
coordination, vaccinations). 
Advanced planning can facilitate an effective coordinated response for 
communities faced with the possibility of similar future outbreaks of 
HIV or HCV among networks of PWID. This document is intended to 
help health departments prepare for such an outbreak. The document 
provides guidance on how to plan for an outbreak of HIV or HCV among 
PWID including considerations for developing an outbreak response 
plan to minimize the impact of the outbreak on the community and stop 
further transmission. The document also outlines strategies to detect and 
investigate a possible outbreak.
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Outbreak preparedness and detection 
Chapter 1: Introduction to outbreak detection and 
response among people who inject drugs 
What is an outbreak? 
HIV and HCV infection affect every community. If adequate testing and 
surveillance are available, a baseline prevalence of these infections can be 
established. Establishing baseline prevalence helps estimate the number of 
new diagnoses expected in a community. An outbreak refers to an increase 
in the number of new diagnoses in excess of the number expected in a 
particular geographic area or population during a particular period. The 
related term cluster refers to new diagnoses that may be grouped by  
similar epidemiologic features (grouped by place and time) or matching 
viral sequences (a molecular cluster). HIV or HCV outbreaks can be defined 
as follows:
An increase in diagnoses above what is normally expected in  
a geographic area or population during a particular period  
AND evidence of recent transmission of HIV or HCV among  
case-patients. 
Recent transmission typically refers to transmission of HIV or HCV within 
the previous six months. 
What is outbreak response? 
Outbreak response is a process used by public health programs to 
investigate and intervene when an outbreak is suspected or confirmed. 
The ultimate goal of an outbreak response is to interrupt transmission and 
to prevent future infections. Responding to an HIV or HCV outbreak may 
require augmenting and redirecting resources, engaging a large and diverse 
group of partners and stakeholders, building upon collaborations and 
developing targeted communication messages for specific groups. Increased 
resources are usually needed to respond to the increased number of new 
diagnoses and to identify the root causes of the outbreak.
Who is responsible for detecting and responding to an outbreak? 
State and local health departments have jurisdiction and responsibility 
for HIV and HCV prevention in their communities. Depending on state 
law, either the state or local health department has legal authority to 
lead an outbreak response in the jurisdiction. However, because an 
outbreak response may require substantial resources, a state or local 
health department may find it difficult to manage an outbreak response 
while maintaining adequate staffing and coverage for other public health 
activities. Thus, health departments might request assistance from other 
agencies, including neighboring local health departments, the state health 
department, neighboring state health departments, and federal agencies 
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(including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]) to assist 
with the outbreak response. CDC can assist with an outbreak response 
when requested by a state health department, another federal agency, or a 
sovereign entity (e.g., American Indian/Alaska Native tribe, U.S. territory, or 
foreign country).
Why prepare for an outbreak?
Outbreak preparedness provides health department staff with general 
direction about how to initiate a response when and if an outbreak occurs. 
A response plan for a specific outbreak may be a modification of a health 
department’s general outbreak plans. Areas that are vulnerable to HIV or 
HCV outbreaks (e.g., areas with high numbers of drug overdose deaths, 
prescription opioid sales) should consider having HIV and HCV specific 
outbreak response plans. 
Preparedness also establishes relationships in advance with potential key 
staff and partners who may be engaged if an outbreak occurs. For an 
outbreak of HIV or HCV infections among PWID, key staff and partners 
include those with expertise in policy, communications, law, finance, 
insurance enrollment, and health care access. 
Standing outbreak response plans cannot predict all the issues pertinent 
to a specific outbreak. However, planning for the more predictable aspects 
of an outbreak allows more time to respond to an outbreak. For example, 
given that lack of access to sterile syringes may be an important aspect of 
an outbreak among PWID, it is important that health departments establish 
contact with resources that can quickly provide sterile syringes.
Chapter 1 | Introduction to outbreak detection and response among people who inject drugs
Outbreak preparedness 
provides health 
department staff with 
general direction 
about how to initiate a 
response when and if an 
outbreak occurs.
Managing HIV and Hepatitis C Outbreaks Among People Who Inject Drugs—A Guide for State And Local Health Departments
5
Chapter 2: Planning for an outbreak response
Planning is essential to a prompt, effective response to an outbreak. 
Specifically, planning can improve the outbreak response of HIV and viral 
hepatitis prevention programs by allowing time to assign authorities, draft 
policies, and outline procedures for managing a public health response. 
The final product of planning is an outbreak response plan. Below are 
issues to consider when developing an outbreak response plan including 
readiness prior to an outbreak and planning for the detection of and 
response to an outbreak.
Issues to consider in planning: readiness prior to an emergency
Determining what prompts an outbreak investigation
When creating an outbreak response plan, state and local health 
departments should establish the criteria for an HIV or HCV outbreak in 
their jurisdiction and the threshold at which the outbreak response plan 
is to be initiated. Not all outbreaks require activation of a comprehensive 
outbreak response plan. 
Determining who is responsible for investigating and responding to  
an outbreak
State and local health departments are responsible for leading responses to 
HIV and HCV outbreaks in their jurisdictions. When assembling an HIV and 
HCV outbreak response team, identifying the people or teams responsible 
for the following activities should be considered:
■■ Leadership, management, and oversight of outbreak activities*
■■ HIV or HCV surveillance activities
■■ Contact investigation and epidemiologic investigation
■■ Data management
■■ Provision of HIV or HCV testing and transport of laboratory 
specimens
■■ Laboratory testing
■■ Control and prevention measures
■■ Coordination of HIV or HCV treatment
■■ Coordination/provision of hepatitis A and hepatitis B vaccination 
services
■■ Coordination/provision of risk-reduction services
■■ Coordination/provision of substance-use treatment services
■■ Coordination with external partners and agencies
■■ Risk communication and communication with media
■■ Health education
■■ Other support activities, such as logistics and liaison with law 
enforcement
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*For complex outbreaks or for outbreaks in which multiple jurisdictions or 
agencies are involved, health departments might consider using an incident 
command system (ICS). (For an example of how an ICS can be used during 
an outbreak response, see Chapter 10 and Appendix D.) 
Planning for additional staff or resource assistance during an outbreak
Depending on the size and complexity of the outbreak, additional staff 
may be required to support the outbreak response. An outbreak response 
plan includes an outline for requesting assistance from other agencies 
and determining when additional assistance is necessary, such as from 
neighboring local health departments, the state health department, and 
CDC. Deciding when to request assistance first requires determining the 
current health department capacity and at what point, before or after 
exceeding this capacity, to request assistance. 
A memorandum of understanding (MOU), between state health 
departments or between local health departments within a state, can be 
used to request assistance from other states or jurisdictions. Ideally, an 
MOU should be in place before an outbreak occurs and should specify the 
resources that can be shared between states. 
Requesting technical assistance
Health departments that need HIV technical assistance can contact the 
CDC Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Prevention Program Branch Project 
Officer or HIV Incidence and Case Surveillance Branch Project Officer. 
Health departments can also contact CDC-INFO (https://www.cdc.gov/
cdc-info/about.html), a CDC contact center established to answer public 
inquires. CDC-INFO can be reached by phone at 1-800-CDC-INFO (232-
4636) or by email at www.cdc.gov/info. 
For viral hepatitis technical assistance, health departments can contact 
the CDC Division of Viral Hepatitis, Prevention Branch Project Officer or 
Surveillance Branch Project Officer. Alternatively, health departments can 
contact CDC-INFO or email ViralHepatitisOutbreak@cdc.gov. 
(For information about how to request CDC laboratory assistance, see 
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9)
Requesting an Epi-Aid
Public health authorities can request short-term epidemiologic assistance—
an Epi-Aid—to respond to an urgent public health problem. An Epi-Aid 
is a short-term field investigation and technical assistance provided by 
an Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) officer and other CDC subject 
matter experts. The purpose of an Epi-Aid is to assist local partners in 
rapidly controlling the public health problem. An Epi-Aid can increase the 
technical capacity and the size of the workforce responding to the public 
health problem and can simplify access to CDC subject matter experts and 
laboratory resources. The requesting public health authority maintains 
overall leadership of the investigation. 
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Who can request an Epi-Aid?
A variety of public health officials (e.g., state, territorial, or local public 
health authorities) can request an Epi-Aid. When a local jurisdiction within 
a state requests an Epi-Aid, CDC ensures that the appropriate state-level 
health officials, if not already aware, are informed of the request.
How to request an Epi-Aid
■■ A state or local public health authority contacts the CDC subject 
matter expert or the EIS program office to request an Epi-Aid.
■■ The CDC subject matter expert contacts the EIS program (or vice 
versa) to discuss the request. If CDC can support the Epi-Aid, the CDC 
subject matter expert notifies the requesting authority. 
■■ Once notified that CDC can support an Epi-Aid, the requesting 
authority emails an invitation to the CDC subject matter expert 
contact or to the EIS Program Chief at EpiAid@cdc.gov. 
■■ Once the emailed invitation is received, the EIS program decides 
whether to approve and activate the Epi-Aid. 
(For more information about Epi-Aids, see https://www.cdc.gov/eis/
downloads/requesting-epi-aid.pdf) 
(For information about how to request disease intervention specialist (DIS) 
support from CDC, see Chapter 6)
Developing communication plans
During an outbreak, coordination of information among staff and all 
partners is essential. Plans should be developed to disseminate pertinent 
information internally (within programs) and between agencies and 
external partners. A plan should also be developed for communicating 
with the media. (For general guidance on how to develop an outbreak 
communication plan see, https://www.nphic.org/toolkits/outbreak/item/
download/3962_0ffb487900a79d136ba77b5920da168d)
Educating staff 
Before an outbreak, and on an ongoing basis, staff should be educated 
about core strategies for preventing HIV and HCV transmission among 
PWID. An outbreak response plan should specify staff training. For 
example,
■■ HIV and HCV testing, including screening for acute HIV infection
■■ Partner services, including contact tracing
■■ Community education, including condom distribution
■■ Risk-reduction services, including syringe service programs and 
medication-assisted treatment
■■ Mental health and substance use treatment
■■ HIV and HCV treatment
Chapter 2 | Planning for an outbreak response
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■■ HIV preexposure prophylaxis and HIV postexposure prophylaxis
■■ Viral hepatitis prevention including vaccination for hepatitis A and 
hepatitis B
■■ Scientific ethics and patient privacy and confidentiality 
■■ Communication with the media
■■ Other training related to engagement with the community (e.g., 
cultural competency)
Identifying access to treatment
Planners should identify local providers and clinics that can provide HIV 
or HCV care and treatment, establish the capacity of the health department 
and local clinics to provide prevention care and treatment (i.e., number 
of persons with HIV or HCV a provider or clinic can reasonably treat), 
and develop protocols for referring affected persons to care. Health 
departments that provide care and treatment should determine the 
threshold for referral to sources of care outside the local health department 
and potentially outside the local area. Areas with limited access to HIV 
or HCV providers should develop a plan for rapid access to HIV and 
HCV prevention and treatment services. This plan may include the use of 
telehealth technology or bringing providers from outside the local area to 
work alongside local providers. Health departments might also develop an 
outline for assisting persons with enrollment in insurance plans. 
Identifying access to substance-use treatment services
PWID may need screening and referral to mental health and substance-
use treatment services. Health departments should consider developing 
protocols for referring affected persons to mental health and substance 
use treatment as part of the response plan. The following are pertinent 
considerations: 
■■ Number and location(s) of mental health providers and substance-use 
treatment centers
■■ Type of facility services (e.g., inpatient treatment, intensive outpatient 
treatment, individual and group counseling)
■■ Average number of treatment slots available at any given time
■■ Number of medication-assisted treatment providers in area
■■ The maximum number of persons that can be treated by these 
providers 
Partnerships during an outbreak 
When developing an outbreak response plan, health departments should 
consider identifying potential community and government partners, their 
resources, and their capacity to provide services and resources during 
an outbreak. Potential community partners include community based 
organizations (CBOs), health care providers, hospitals, mental health 
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providers, substance-use-treatment providers, pharmacies, and risk-
reduction providers. Potential governmental partners may include leaders 
in local government, law enforcement, jails and prisons, emergency 
management agencies, and county hospitals. In addition, health 
departments should consider involving these groups in the development of 
the outbreak plan. (For information about working with law enforcement 
and CBOs, see Chapter 11 and Chapter 12)
Practicing for an outbreak
After an outbreak response plan has been developed, one way to test an 
outbreak response plan is by conducting an exercise in which the team 
discusses, in an informal setting, a simulated outbreak scenario. Such an 
exercise helps the team assess the plan, policies, and procedures and 
clarify staff roles and responsibilities. The plan can then be revised on the 
basis of the strengths and weaknesses identified during the exercise. 
Issues to consider in planning: detecting an outbreak
Detecting an HIV or HCV outbreak among PWID
Timely detection of an HIV or HCV outbreak is important to prevent 
further transmission of infections and minimize the magnitude of an 
outbreak. An outbreak response plan should include an outline of how 
health department resources will be used to detect an outbreak. 
An outbreak response plan might include protocols for detecting an HIV or 
HCV outbreak using the following:
■■ Systematic analysis and review of case surveillance data
■■ Systematic analysis and review of molecular surveillance data
■■ Use of partner-services and contact-investigation data 
■■ Enhanced surveillance, including additional specimen testing (e.g., 
pooled nucleic acid test [NAT], genotyping)
■■ Observations of staff in the health department, CBOs, and clinical 
settings
■■ Use of data to detect non-sterile injection drug use (e.g., rates of 
endocarditis as well as deep abscesses and other skin and soft-tissue 
infections) 
(For information about detecting an HIV or HCV outbreak, see Chapter 3)
Issues to consider in planning: responding to an emergency
Conducting the outbreak investigation
When the roles and responsibilities of health department staff and 
community partners have been determined before an outbreak, the 
outbreak response team can move quickly to confirm the outbreak, find 
cases, report findings, implement prevention and control measures, and 
monitor response to these interventions. (For information about conducting 
an outbreak investigation, see Chapters 4–9)
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Educating PWID
An HIV and HCV outbreak response plan should include education for 
PWID, who need to know how to prevent transmission of infection. Plans 
to educate the population should be part of an outbreak response plan. 
Education should cover (as permitted by law) medication-assisted treatment, 
safer injection practices and wound care, overdose prevention, hepatitis A 
and hepatitis B vaccination, and testing for HIV and HCV infection. 
Referring affected persons for treatment 
After an outbreak has been detected, affected persons require treatment. 
The list of treatment resources developed before the outbreak should be 
used to coordinate care (e.g., antiviral therapy, mental health treatment, 
substance use treatment). (For information about coordinating HIV and HCV 
treatment, see Chapter 13 and Chapter 14. For information about substance 
use treatment and recovery services, see Chapter 16.) 
Identifying access to sterile syringes
Planners should be aware of local syringe services programs and their 
capacity. Planners should review local laws and regulations regarding 
syringe services programs. Planners should also review syringe access laws 
and practices to determine if local pharmacies can be utilized to provide 
sterile syringes. In areas without ready access to sterile syringes, the 
response plan might specify the additional resources that would be needed 
to provide a syringe services program. (For information about establishing a 
syringe services program, see Chapter 15)
Deactivating and evaluating the outbreak response
Planners should include threshold criteria for reducing resources (when 
intense outbreak-related activities are no longer required) and for 
demobilizing resources. They should also prepare plans for an evaluation 
and review of the overall outbreak response.
Notes from the field
In 2016, the Viral Hepatitis staff, Tennessee Department of Health (with support from HIV, 
Sexually Transmitted Disease [STD], Immunizations, Hospital-Acquired Infections, Emergency 
Preparedness, and Surveillance Systems/Informatics staff), convened a working group that 
met bimonthly to discuss best practices for responding to an HIV/HCV outbreak. As a direct 
result of this working group, an HIV/HCV Outbreak Response plan was developed (https://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/programresources/guidance/cluster-outbreak/cdc-hiv-hcv-pwid-
response-plan.pdf ). The Outbreak Response plan and its supporting documents establish a 
framework for the health department to prepare for, and respond to, an outbreak of HIV and 
HCV, describe the ongoing surveillance efforts for HIV and HCV, and outline the roles and 
responsibilities of Tennessee Department of Health staff in the event of (1) a transmission 
cluster investigation or (2) an outbreak investigation.
Chapter 2 | Planning for an outbreak response
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Chapter 3: Detecting an HIV or hepatitis C virus 
outbreak among people who inject drugs 
How are HIV or HCV outbreaks detected? 
Although HIV and HCV infections can be asymptomatic, which can 
cause delayed diagnosis, timely detection of an HIV or HCV outbreak is 
important to preventing further transmission and minimizing an outbreak. 
Health department staff may detect signs suggestive of an outbreak and 
should be encouraged to discuss their observations with the appropriate 
health department staff. Regular meetings and strong working relationships 
between prevention and surveillance staff can facilitate these discussions.
Outbreaks can be detected through the following activities:
■■ Routine and ongoing analysis of HIV or HCV case surveillance  
data to identify aberrant increases in diagnoses in a geographic  
area or population
■■ Identification of unexpected patterns in contact tracing investigations 
and partner services
■■ Analysis of molecular HIV surveillance data to identify clusters of 
closely related cases
■■ Astute observations by health care providers, health department staff, 
or community members
During the activities (above), health department staff should be alert 
for signs of more-than-expected HIV or HCV cases and evidence of 
transmission among persons with a recent diagnosis.
Case surveillance 
Public health programs monitor new diagnoses of HIV and acute HCV 
infection by geographic area, population, and time in their jurisdiction. 
Some states also monitor new diagnoses of chronic HCV infection. This 
surveillance information determines the baseline level of HIV and HCV 
infection in a community and informs the expected number of new HIV 
and HCV diagnoses. An unexpected increase in the number of HIV or HCV 
diagnoses in a geographic area or population can be one of the first signs 
of an outbreak.
Similarities in patient demographics, reported risk factors, and recency 
of infection may also be early signs of an outbreak. In areas with a low 
reported incidence of HIV or HCV (e.g., rural communities), outbreaks can 
be more easily detected through case surveillance because any increase 
could indicate an outbreak. Improved timeliness of case surveillance 
reporting may improve a jurisdiction’s ability to detect an outbreak.
An increase in the reported number of new HIV or HCV diagnoses does 
not always indicate an outbreak; an increase in reported new diagnoses 
may reflect an increase in testing, which may reflect diagnoses of persons 
with long-standing infection. In general, acute HIV infections (determined 
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through laboratory tests that can detect HIV antigen or ribonucleic acid 
[RNA]), recent HIV infections (determined through HIV recency tests) 
and HIV infections diagnosed for persons who tested HIV-negative in 
the preceding 6 months are clear indicators of recent HIV transmissions. 
Recent HIV transmissions, when detected, represent cases with early HIV 
infections. HCV infections in young persons are more likely to have been 
recently acquired.15 
Monitoring surveillance reports for transmission category 
HIV surveillance data (stored in the enhanced HIV/AIDS Reporting System) 
should be monitored for increases in HIV cases reported with “history of 
injection drug use” as the transmission category. An increase in the number 
of HIV reports in this category, compared to baseline data or an increase 
in these reports from neighboring communities, contiguous counties, and 
nonurban areas should be prioritized for investigation and follow-up. 
Analysis could also be conducted to assess increases in cases reported with 
combined history of “male-to-male sexual contact and injection drug use.” 
However, it should be noted that increases in cases with the transmission 
category of “male-to-male sexual contact and injection drug use” do not 
necessarily represent increased transmission through injection drug use. 
Men who have sex with men (MSM) are the population most severely 
affected by HIV and previous analyses suggest that sexual transmission is 
likely the primary transmission route for MSM who inject drugs.18 Public 
health staff should, therefore, first consider male-to-male sexual contact as 
the primary transmission route for persons with combined history of “male-
to-male sexual contact and injection drug use.” 
Although resources may not allow for complete identification of HCV 
risk on all reports, the HCV surveillance registry should be monitored for 
increases in the numbers of HCV-infected persons who reported injection 
drug use.
Contact tracing investigations and partner services
DIS are public health outreach workers who are responsible for locating, 
counseling, and educating persons with sexually transmitted and other 
communicable diseases—and their contacts. DIS work for local or state 
health departments or for federal public health agencies. Some DIS 
are trained in phlebotomy, rapid HIV and HCV testing, and advanced 
interviewing. 
DIS routinely perform contact tracing investigations for all persons with 
newly diagnosed HIV infection; these investigations focus on providing 
services (including linkage to HIV care) for the HIV-infected person and 
outreach and testing for their partners or contacts who may have been 
exposed to HIV. These services are often referred to as partner services. 
While the full extent of partner services are generally not offered to 
persons with HCV infection, DIS can identify and locate contacts of persons 
newly infected with HCV during an outbreak investigation.
Chapter 3 | Detecting an HIV or hepatitis C virus outbreak among people who inject drugs
HIV surveillance data 
should be monitored for 
increases in HIV cases 
reported with “history of 
injection drug use” as the 
transmission category.
Managing HIV and Hepatitis C Outbreaks Among People Who Inject Drugs—A Guide for State And Local Health Departments
13
DIS, because they work extensively in local communities, are positioned 
to notice unexpected patterns or increases in HIV and HCV diagnoses. For 
example, DIS may notice that contact-tracing services are being conducted 
for two persons in a neighborhood without previous HIV diagnoses and 
that these persons have named the same syringe-sharing partners. 
The following are other findings from a contact tracing or partner services 
investigation that may indicate an HIV or HCV outbreak:
■■ A high number of reported syringe-sharing contacts—suggesting a 
large and densely connected network of injection drug users
■■ Several HIV or HCV infections diagnosed among the named contacts 
of the index patient 
■■ HIV or HCV infections diagnosed among social contacts of the  
index patient
■■ Same syringe-sharing contact named by more than one index patient 
Someone in the health department (e.g., DIS program manager) should be 
responsible for routinely reviewing partner services results and looking for 
evidence of an outbreak. (For more information about contact tracing and 
partner services, see Chapter 6)
Molecular surveillance
Molecular HIV surveillance provides another method that public health 
programs can use to detect outbreaks. This method may be particularly 
helpful in areas with a high incidence of HIV infection, in outbreaks that 
cross jurisdictions, and in outbreaks in which persons are unwilling or 
unable to provide contact names or locating information. Molecular HIV 
surveillance collects and analyzes HIV nucleotide sequence information 
generated through drug resistance testing performed as part of clinical 
care. If the HIV strains from two or more persons are similar, those persons 
may be in the same transmission cluster. HIV molecular analyses can help 
confirm, disprove, or detect connections among cases (which may be direct 
or indirect). A molecular cluster could be the first sign of an outbreak. 
HCV molecular surveillance may become available in the future and could 
provide another method for detecting HCV outbreaks.
What is an HIV molecular cluster and how does it relate to a  
transmission cluster? 
■■ A molecular cluster is a group of persons with diagnosed HIV 
infection who have genetically similar HIV strains. Persons whose 
viral strains are similar may be closely related by transmission. The 
ability to identify molecular clusters is therefore a tool for identifying 
transmission clusters that may represent possible outbreaks.
■■ Molecular clusters include persons with diagnosed HIV infection  
who entered care, who have HIV drug-resistance test results, and 
whose sequences were sent to the state/local HIV surveillance 
program for analysis.
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■■ A molecular cluster is a subset of a transmission cluster (Figure 3-1). 
A transmission cluster can include 
■■ persons with diagnosed infection for whom a sequence for 
analysis is not available because they did not enter care; they 
entered care but did not have an HIV drug-resistance test; 
they entered care and had an HIV drug resistance test, but the 
sequence was not transmitted to the health department for 
analysis or was of poor quality and thus could not be analyzed 
■■ persons with undiagnosed infection
■■ The underlying risk network of the molecular cluster includes the 
persons in the transmission cluster as well as HIV-uninfected persons 
at risk of acquiring HIV.
■■ Molecular HIV surveillance data can serve as a proxy for an 
epidemiologic relationship but cannot reveal which cases are directly 
related by transmission or determine the direction of transmission. 
This is because it is possible to observe 2 persons with genetically 
similar HIV strains who are not necessarily directly linked by 
transmission; the relationship could be indirect, and unidentified 
persons could be involved in transmission relationships.
■■ Once a molecular cluster is identified, the molecular cluster can be 
characterized by using case surveillance information; however, the 
corresponding transmission cluster and risk network can be identified 
only through investigation (detailed in Chapter 6). 
Figure 3‑1: Molecular HIV cluster and its underlying  
transmission cluster and risk network
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How are nucleotide sequence data generated and collected?
■■ Nucleotide sequence data are generated through HIV drug-resistance 
testing. This testing is recommended for all persons with diagnosed 
HIV infection at entry to HIV care to help HIV providers select an 
appropriate treatment regimen. The testing can also be ordered later 
(e.g., for a person who is receiving treatment but whose viral load is 
not suppressed or for a person whose antiretroviral therapy regimen 
is being changed). 
■■ HIV genetic sequence data are routinely reported to the local/
state HIV surveillance programs and to CDC through the National 
HIV Surveillance System. During 2013–2017, 27 U.S. jurisdictions 
participated in molecular HIV surveillance.
■■ Health departments report these data to CDC with case information 
collected by HIV surveillance programs (demographics, transmission 
category, CD4 results, viral load results), but without identifying 
information (e.g., name, street address).
How are molecular clusters identified?
The genetic sequence of HIV changes over time. Immediately following 
transmission of HIV between two persons, the genetic sequence of the 
HIV virus strain in the recipient will be nearly identical to strains found 
in the transmitting person. As time passes, however, the strains infecting 
each person will change independently of each other and will look more 
and more different. Therefore, persons whose viral strains are genetically 
similar may be closely related in transmission.
The nucleotide sequences of each strain is compared with every other 
HIV nucleotide sequence to identify pairs of sequences that are extremely 
similar (i.e., sequences between which the genetic distance, or difference,  
is very small). Pairs of cases with similar sequences are then connected  
to construct molecular clusters and identify clusters of very closely  
related cases.
CDC conducts quarterly analyses of national molecular surveillance data to 
identify clusters that, on the basis of the number of closely related cases, 
raise concerns about the recent, rapid transmission of HIV. When a cluster 
of concern is identified, CDC notifies the primary jurisdiction and securely 
transmits a cluster snapshot describing the cluster.
CDC has developed an analytic tool called Secure HIV-TRACE, which  
allows for state and local analysis of molecular surveillance data. Secure 
HIV-TRACE allows state and local health departments to define parameters 
for molecular cluster identification, such as the genetic distance threshold, 
to suit analytic goals locally while maintaining the ability to conduct 
analyses that are aligned with CDC approaches. Secure HIV-TRACE is 
available to state and local HIV surveillance program staff at https://secure.
hivtrace.org/. 
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(For more information about molecular HIV surveillance, see https://
wwwdev.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/funding/announcements/ps18-1802/CDC-HIV-
PS18-1802-AttachmentE-Detecting-Investigating-and-Responding-to-HIV-
Transmission-Clusters.pdf)
Observations from health department staff and others in  
the community
HIV and HCV outbreaks are sometimes first detected through astute 
observations from health department staff. For example, public health 
nurses who provide HIV testing in a prison may notice that they have made 
several HIV diagnoses among new inmates from the same rural community, 
or a doctor in an emergency department may make several HCV diagnoses 
among persons being treated for skin and soft-tissue infections. Such 
observations call for further investigation to determine whether and how 
these persons are connected to each other and others in the community. 
Enhanced surveillance for HIV and HCV outbreaks among PWID
HIV and HCV infections (acute and chronic) are nationally notifiable 
diseases. Local and state public health agencies play a vital role in 
monitoring HIV and HCV disease trends and outbreaks. Protocols to 
identify early HIV and HCV infection, to ensure case reporting, and to 
prioritize cases for follow-up investigation can be developed to enhance 
standard surveillance systems and ultimately, detect HIV and HCV infection 
clusters or outbreaks. 
Although CDC directly funds HIV surveillance programs, funding for 
HCV surveillance varies among jurisdictions. Many health department 
surveillance programs receive a high volume of HCV laboratory test results 
but do not have staff or systems to investigate, review, or classify individual 
reports. If an HIV or HCV cluster is identified, surveillance data specific 
to the population at high risk can provide public health officials with the 
detailed information needed to allocate resources to affected persons and 
those at highest risk of infection.
What is enhanced surveillance?
Enhanced HIV and HCV surveillance supplements standard surveillance in 
order to monitor changes in HIV and HCV epidemiology, identify disease 
burden and the need for care and treatment in specific populations, and 
prevent new infections. Enhanced surveillance includes the collection of 
data that may not be collected by standard surveillance systems. Enhanced 
surveillance usually requires supplemental funding and staff for detection 
of HIV and HCV outbreaks, and includes collaboration among data 
managers, epidemiologists, and DIS. Information management systems and 
high-quality reporting systems, including laboratory-based reporting, are 
important components of enhanced surveillance. 
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Information to increase provider awareness 
Increased provider awareness of the potential for an HIV or HCV outbreak 
among PWID is important for enhanced surveillance. A jurisdiction may 
consider releasing a public health advisory to call attention to the risk of 
HIV and HCV outbreaks among PWID in the jurisdiction. The advisory 
may describe the population at risk, explain testing recommendations, 
and explain the use of risk-based screening questions to identify persons 
for HIV and HCV testing. The advisory should also remind clinicians and 
laboratorians of the state requirements for the reporting of HIV and HCV 
infections. When an HIV or HCV outbreak is identified, an advisory should 
be repeated or a health alert issued. 
Testing and reporting among populations at high risk
Enhanced surveillance may result in increased screening or case finding 
at clinics and community locations (e.g., syringe services programs, jails 
and prisons, substance-use treatment facilities, emergency departments, 
and other outreach sites). HIV and HCV rapid tests (results available 
within 20 minutes) have proven useful in increasing testing in hard-to-
reach populations. Because these tests are not performed in a laboratory, 
they are not typically reported electronically to the health department. 
Staff from non-laboratory testing sites must have mechanisms in place to 
report reactive test results to the public health authority as statute and 
administrative code allow. 
Prioritization of acute and early infections
Acute HIV infection is the period immediately after infection 
(approximately first 6 weeks after infection) when the virus is detectable by 
a NAT or antigen test but antibody response is immature or undetectable. 
Acute infection is the period of peak viremia and greatest risk of infecting 
others. During the acute period, nonspecific symptoms (fever, malaise, 
lymphadenopathy, and skin rash) develop in 50%–80% of acutely infected 
persons. (For more information about detection of acute HIV infection, see 
Chapter 8) 
Early HIV infection generally is considered the time up to 6 months  
after infection during which anti-HIV antibodies are detectable. Early 
infection can be detected based on testing history (a negative HIV test 
result ≤180 days before the first positive test result). (For HIV case 
surveillance definitions, see https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/rr6303a1.htm)
The 2016 Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists defines acute 
HCV as an onset of discrete illness consistent with acute viral hepatitis and 
jaundice or an alanine aminotransferase level of >200 IU/L. Laboratory 
criteria for diagnosis includes a positive test result for HCV antibody, NAT 
for HCV RNA, or presence of HCV viral antigen (For acute HCV surveillance 
definition, see https://www.cdc.gov/nndss/conditions/hepatitis-c-acute/; for 
more information about detection of acute HCV infection, see Chapter 9)
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Complete data on persons with acute or recent infection can enhance 
understanding of transmission-related factors. Complete data may 
include demographics, risk group for transmission, patient contacts (e.g., 
needle-sharing, sexual, social), and clinical and laboratory information. 
Interventions to prevent further transmission of HIV and HCV are 
considered most effective during acute infection (a highly infectious 
period). Although acute infection is an important focus for outbreak 
detection, a low incidence of acute HIV or HCV should not be interpreted 
as low overall prevalence of these infections; it is inherently difficult to 
capture all infections during the time-limited acute phase, especially when 
symptoms are nonspecific. 
HCV reports for adolescents and young adults 
Because most acute HCV infections are asymptomatic, many persons with 
newly acquired infection have not been tested or have not sought care. 
Data indicate that persons aged 15–29 years with diagnosed HCV infection 
are more likely than older persons to be newly infected. Furthermore,  
most HCV infections in the age group 15–29 are attributable to injection 
drug use.12–15
Of all persons with newly reported chronic HCV, a subset of those aged 
<30 years should be followed-up to collect the following information: (1) 
demographics, (2) clinical and laboratory criteria information to classify 
cases according to the definitions of the Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, (3) risk factors for infection, (4) and risk factors for 
ongoing community transmission including information on potential 
networks of contacts. As resources allow, jurisdictions should routinely 
(e.g., monthly or quarterly) review HCV reports in any case-classification 
(e.g., probable, confirmed) from this age group. In addition, because of the 
delay in acquiring the information needed to confirm and finalize a case 
report, all cases in nonfinal status should also be considered for follow-up. 
Collaboration between HIV and HCV surveillance programs 
Coinfection with HIV and HCV is common among PWID: an estimated 
50%–90% of HIV-infected PWID are also infected with HCV.19 HCV, 
compared with HIV, survives longer on surfaces and is more easily 
transmitted by injection drug use.20,21 An increase in HCV infections can 
indicate shared use of injection equipment, which may indicate that a 
community is at increased risk of an HIV outbreak.
HIV/HCV coinfection may be identified by using laboratory information 
available at the time of report. Routine linkage of HIV and HCV registries 
to identify new HIV/HCV coinfections can help monitor for an increase in 
HIV transmission associated with injection drug use, as well as for recent 
HIV infection among persons with HCV infection. An increase in new 
HIV infections among persons with HCV may indicate transmission from 
injection drug use. 
Regular (e.g., monthly or quarterly) meetings of staff from HIV and viral 
hepatitis surveillance units (e.g., data managers, epidemiologists, and HIV 
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partner services staff) to share epidemiologic data may facilitate early 
recognition of clusters. Persons with shared contacts can be identified by 
collaborative review of individual-level data (e.g., syringe sharing partners, 
participation in the same sexual networks) and epidemiologic data such as 
persons with HIV and HCV whose demographic data are similar or who 
live in the same community. 
Mapping databases
In many states, data on HIV, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), and 
viral hepatitis are stored in separate surveillance databases. Database 
mapping (the process of creating data element mappings between two or 
more distinct databases) ensures that data collected during an outbreak 
are disseminated to the appropriate databases throughout, and at the 
conclusion of, an outbreak. Regardless of the questionnaire or database 
used for the outbreak data collection, it is important to embed database-
mapping elements in the outbreak questionnaire to ensure that outbreak 
data can be added to surveillance databases and ensure testing history for 
each patient. An example of an outbreak questionnaire is located within 
the Tennessee Department of Health HIV and HCV Outbreak Response 
Plan (https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/programresources/guidance/cluster-
outbreak/cdc-hiv-hcv-pwid-response-plan.pdf). The questionnaire contains 
the data elements required in surveillance databases for each condition and 
can function as a key for database mapping of three specific surveillance 
databases (enhanced  
HIV/AIDS Reporting System, National Electronic Disease Surveillance 
System Base System, and the Patient Reporting Investigation  
Surveillance Manager). 
Other data to consider
Behavioral surveillance data
Some jurisdictions collect HIV behavioral surveillance data. The objective of 
behavioral surveillance is to assess prevalence and trends in risk behavior 
for HIV infection including injection drug use.22 Information collected on 
drug injection practices (e.g., date of most recent injection, place where 
person gets needles, needle sharing, sharing of drug injection equipment) 
can be used to identify areas with a high prevalence of injection drug use 
and high-risk injection practices.
Inpatient or death certificate data
Areas that experience a high burden of hospitalization or mortality related 
to injection drug use (e.g., opioid overdose, heroin poisoning) can be 
identified by using statewide inpatient and death certificate data. Although 
the availability of data in these statewide databases often lag by 12–15 
months, an analysis of mortality related to injection drug use may reveal 
areas in a jurisdiction that can be targeted for HIV and HCV testing and 
enhanced surveillance. 
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Syndromic surveillance data
Syndromic surveillance is a tool used by public health programs for 
early detection of outbreaks. The National Syndromic Surveillance 
Program makes current platforms available to state and local partners. 
Some jurisdictions have successfully used syndromic surveillance data 
to identify increases in emergency department visits related to injection 
drug use and opioid overdose. Jurisdictions already using such National 
Syndromic Surveillance Program platforms might consider using syndromic 
surveillance related to risk of HIV and HCV infection. 
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Outbreak investigation
Chapter 4: Introduction
An outbreak investigation identifies the characteristics of affected persons 
in the outbreak and the characteristics of the underlying risk network—
information that can guide intervention efforts to improve health outcomes 
and prevent additional infections. An outbreak investigation includes the 
examination of current data and the collection of new data to identify 
factors associated with transmission. The following are the goals of an 
outbreak investigation: 
■■ Determine the extent of the outbreak and the risk network (e.g., 
undiagnosed cases, diagnosed cases not previously linked to the 
outbreak, persons at risk of infection)
■■ Identify factors associated with transmission
■■ Understand connections between cases
■■ Assess risk for ongoing transmission
■■ Determine the interventions that might stop the outbreak
Components of an HIV or HCV outbreak investigation 
1. Create a case definition. A case definition should capture not only the 
cases that were identified initially (e.g., through molecular analysis 
or partner notification) but also cases that could be part of the 
underlying transmission cluster. (For information about developing a 
case definition, see Chapter 5)
2. Identify available data sources (e.g., local surveillance data, partner 
services data, local STD and viral hepatitis data, Ryan White HIV/
AIDS Program data, surveillance data from other jurisdictions, jail 
databases, social network sites).
3. Organize and display the information.
4. Review available data to address investigation-relevant questions.
a. Review partner services data to identify cases that meet the case 
definition and to assess the size of the underlying risk network. 
b. Identify factors possibly associated with transmission.
c. Determine possible connections between persons with 
diagnosed infection.
d. Assess potential risk of continued transmissions from persons 
with diagnosed infection.
5. Increase case finding through contact tracing and increased HIV and 
HCV testing.
6. Collect additional information, including potential review of medical 
records and interviews, as needed.
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7. Synthesize data.
8. Implement prevention and control measures.
9. Continue to synthesize information and refine intervention strategies 
as new information becomes available.
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Chapter 5: Developing a case definition
Creating a case definition is one of the initial steps in the investigation of 
a potential HIV or HCV outbreak and should account for the confirmed, 
probable, and possible cases in an underlying transmission cluster. A 
case definition can be based on what is known—at the beginning of 
an investigation—from surveillance data, HIV and HCV testing data, 
contact tracing and partner services data, molecular analysis, and other 
sources. The following are examples of information that may be helpful in 
developing a case definition for an HIV or HCV outbreak. 
■■ Time of HIV or HCV diagnosis: Establish the beginning of the outbreak. 
The beginning may be a specific date after which all new HIV or 
HCV diagnoses are considered potentially part of the outbreak (e.g., 
≤1 year before the date the index case [the first identified case of 
a potential outbreak or cluster] was diagnosed), or it may be an 
arbitrarily chosen date (e.g., beginning of a calendar year). Given the 
date of recent HIV or HCV diagnosis, consider whether each person 
with a new diagnosis has a prior negative test result that confirms a 
new infection at the time of interest.
■■ Geography: Establish the region of interest. Determine whether 
persons who are potential cases reside in, visited, or had contact with 
residents of the region of interest during the time frame of interest.
■■ HIV or HCV risk factors: Determine whether persons who are potential 
cases report specific risk factors associated with the outbreak, such 
as injection drug use or sexual contact with PWID, during the time 
frame of interest.
■■ Contact-tracing investigation: Determine whether persons who are 
potential cases were named as a needle-sharing or sexual partner 
during a contact tracing investigation. Determine whether a person 
with newly diagnosed HIV or HCV infection named a needle-sharing 
or sexual contact whose infection is considered a possible, probable, 
or confirmed case in the outbreak. 
■■ Molecular analysis: Determine whether HIV or HCV molecular 
analysis indicates similarity to the outbreak strain.
Notes from the field
During the 2015 HIV/HCV outbreak in Scott County, Indiana, the following case definition was 
developed: A laboratory-confirmed HIV infection newly diagnosed after October 1, 2014, in a 
person who either resided in Scott County, Indiana, or was named by another case-patient as 
a syringe-sharing or sex partner.17
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Chapter 6: Contact tracing and partner services
What is contact tracing? 
Contact tracing is the identification, location, and follow-up of all persons 
who are needle-sharing or sexual partner(s) of persons with newly 
diagnosed HIV or HCV. Once located, contacts are offered testing and 
treatment. Rapid identification and testing of partners can reduce further 
transmission.23 Contact tracing is therefore essential to ending an outbreak. 
If contact tracing is not conducted thoroughly, transmission is likely to 
continue, which, in turn, will require continued response efforts. 
Contact tracing is most commonly conducted by DIS but can be conducted 
by other health care professionals, including nurses and medical providers. 
Persons infected with HIV or HCV are interviewed to elicit information 
about sexual or needle-sharing partners in the previous 12 months so that 
those partners can be confidentially notified of their possible exposure. 
Either the newly diagnosed person (index patient) or health department 
staff (e.g., DIS) can notify sex- and needle-sharing partners of the index 
patient. If health department staff notifies the partners, they inform 
partners of their exposure without identifying the index patient. If index 
patients wish to inform their partner(s) themselves, DIS can provide 
coaching to assist with this process. Regardless of whether all partners 
identified by the index patient are located and notified, compiling a list of 
all persons identified by the index patient enables the DIS to maintain an 
accurate record of all persons at risk of infection.
What are partner services?
Partner services comprise a group of services (e.g., prevention counseling, 
testing for HIV or other STIs, testing for viral hepatitis, linkage to medical 
care, and linkage or referral to other prevention services such as substance 
use treatment and mental health services) offered to persons with newly 
diagnosed HIV infection and his or her partners. 
Partner services, although particularly useful during an outbreak, are 
also conducted outside the outbreak setting. Health departments use 
surveillance data (individual and aggregate) to identify persons with newly 
diagnosed infection as candidates for partner services. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, partner services data can be used to identify potential outbreaks. 
Cluster interviewing and social network strategy of testing
Persons with newly diagnosed HIV or HCV may be reluctant or unable 
to share partner contact information (e.g., when names of partners are 
unknown). Thus, it may be useful to collect information about social 
network contacts. The process of eliciting contact information for persons 
other than the index patient’s partners, who might also be at risk of 
infection, is referred to as cluster interviewing. Cluster interviewing, or 
the related social network strategy for HIV testing, may be useful adjuncts 
Chapter 6 | Contact tracing and partner services
Contact tracing is 
essential to ending  
an outbreak. If 
contact tracing is not 
conducted thoroughly, 
transmission is likely to 
continue, which, in turn, 
will require continued 
response efforts.
Contact tracing is the 
identification, location, 
and follow-up of 
all persons who are 
needle-sharing or sexual 
partner(s) of persons 
with newly diagnosed 
HIV or HCV.
Managing HIV and Hepatitis C Outbreaks Among People Who Inject Drugs—A Guide for State And Local Health Departments
25
to traditional contact tracing.24 When using the social network strategy, 
HIV-positive and high-risk HIV-negative persons recruit persons from their 
social, sexual, or needle-sharing networks for testing.25 This strategy can be 
useful because it includes eliciting partner and social contact information 
even if someone tests negative. 
(For more information about the social network strategy for HIV testing, 
see https://effectiveinterventions.cdc.gov/en/HighImpactPrevention/
PublicHealthStrategies/SocialNetworkStrategy.aspx)
Steps to effective contact tracing and partner services
■■ Interview index patient (HIV or HCV) to solicit a list of all syringe-
sharing and sexual partners within the previous 12 months.
■■ Counsel index patient about reducing the risk of transmitting HIV or 
HCV infection.
■■ Locate, contact, and interview all of the index patient’s contacts to test 
for HIV or HCV infection.
■■ Locate, contact and interview all of the index patient’s contacts for 
other possible contacts (associates of the source and index patient) 
and screen those persons for HIV and HCV.
■■ Counsel contacts about reducing their risk of acquiring HIV or HCV.
■■ Provide treatment or referral for treatment for persons who test 
positive for HIV or HCV.
■■ Follow-up persons with diagnosed HIV or HCV to encourage them to 
seek care and treatment. 
■■ Follow-up, as necessary, to retest persons whose initial test may have 
taken place during the window period, but who have continuing 
exposure to HIV or HCV.
(For more information about HIV partner services, see https://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5709a1.htm and 
https://effectiveinterventions.cdc.gov/en/HighImpactPrevention/
PublicHealthStrategies/PartnerServices.aspx) 
Determining the capacity of DIS staff to conduct contact tracing 
DIS are the backbone of contact tracing investigations and partner services. 
A large outbreak, however, might quickly surpass the capacity of a health 
department’s DIS staff. 
Ideally, a health department determines the capacity of its DIS staff before 
an outbreak occurs:
■■ Maximum number of open cases (short- and long-term or mixture of 
short- and long-term cases) that staff can manage at any given time
■■ Amount of travel time required to locate and follow-up persons with 
diagnosed infection
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After determining current capacity, a health department should establish 
the point at which to request additional DIS staff.
During an outbreak, a health department may increase DIS capacity by 
shifting internal staff (e.g., by deploying current staff who previously 
worked as DIS).
Requesting additional DIS to support an outbreak
If responding to an outbreak starts to exceed the state’s current DIS 
resources, the state can request additional DIS support from CDC or from 
other states. Before requesting additional DIS support, a state should 
consider the following:
■■ How many DIS are needed, and how long will additional DIS support 
be needed?
■■ What skill sets are needed? Will responding DIS need advanced 
interviewing skills, phlebotomy skills, ability to conduct rapid HIV or 
HCV testing?
■■ What are the expectations of responding staff? What are the expected 
responsibilities and duties, work hours, and command structure (i.e., 
to whom will the DIS report)?
■■ How will travel and other costs be funded?
■■ What are the health department’s plans after responding DIS leave? 
Requesting additional DIS from CDC
The following are steps for requesting DIS from CDC during an outbreak:
■■ A state public health authority contacts its CDC contact. The CDC 
contact may be the HIV or viral hepatitis project officer or program 
consultant, Regional Management Official, or other CDC contact 
assigned to work with the state. 
■■ The state public health authority summarizes what is known about 
the outbreak, what has been done to address the outbreak, and why 
additional DIS are needed.
■■ The CDC contact, along with the state official, contacts the Field 
Services Branch, Division of STD Prevention, CDC, to discuss the 
state’s needs. 
■■ The state epidemiologist or STD Program Director or Manager makes 
a formal request for CDC DIS assistance to the Field Services Branch, 
Division of STD Prevention, CDC. The request can be in the form of 
an email and should include a brief background (what is currently 
known about the outbreak). Requests for CDC DIS assistance go 
through the Division of STD Prevention regardless of whether the 
outbreak involves an STI.
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Requesting additional DIS through the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact 
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a mutual aid 
agreement between all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. During a governor-declared state of 
emergency, states can use EMAC to request personnel, equipment, supplies, 
and services from other states to assist in the emergency. Public health 
resources, including DIS, Public Information Officers, epidemiologists, 
and data managers, can be requested through EMAC. Requesting and 
assisting states and territories agree to legally binding terms, by which the 
requesting state is responsible for reimbursing costs to the assisting state. 
EMAC legislation allows for interstate recognition of credentials, licenses, 
and certifications.
The following are the steps for requesting DIS or other public health 
resources through EMAC:
■■ The governor of the affected state declares a state of emergency.
■■ The affected state determines the resources (and skills) needed and 
sends a request to State Emergency Management personnel. 
■■ EMAC is activated.
■■ State Emergency Management personnel route the request to other 
EMAC states to find the requested resources.
■■ Potential assisting states determine availability of resources and 
collect offers of assistance within the state.
■■ Requesting and assisting states agree on estimated costs. 
■■ State Emergency Management Agency personnel from the requesting 
and assisting states complete the EMAC Request for Assistance form 
(REQ-A), a legally binding agreement between states that includes all 
terms of the agreement, including cost reimbursement. 
■■ Resources are deployed to the requesting state.
(For more information about EMAC, see http://www.emacweb.org/)
(For a sample completed EMAC form, see http://www.amchp.org/
programsandtopics/CHILD-HEALTH/projects/newborn-screening/
Documents/Template-NBS-Req-A-section1_EMAC.pdf)
Memorandums of understanding between state health 
departments
Because EMAC can be used only after a state of emergency had been 
declared, states may need another mechanism for requesting DIS support, 
between states, during an outbreak. An MOU, between state health 
departments or between local health departments within a state, can be 
used to request DIS assistance from other states or jurisdictions. 
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Notes from the field
To assist with an HIV and HCV outbreak among PWID in rural Indiana in early 2015,  
the Indiana State Department of Health made an EMAC request for personnel to aid in 
contact tracing, HIV rapid testing, phlebotomy, and patient interviews. DIS from nine state 
health departments were provided to Indiana in staggered deployments over approximately 
three months to assist in the outbreak response. Upon arrival at the command center, 
deployed DIS received an initial briefing that included an overview of the drug driving 
the outbreak, refresher training in phlebotomy, training in data systems, and outbreak 
documentation. Between April–November, state, EMAC, and CDC DIS located 536 persons 
who were linked to the outbreak: of these, 468 were assessed for risk, tested for HIV, and if 
HIV-infected, linked to care.
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Chapter 7:  Testing at venues frequented by people 
who inject drugs 
Before and during an HIV or HCV outbreak, testing at venues where 
large numbers of PWID seek medical treatment or other care can improve 
screening rates among this population. High-risk testing venues can be 
clinical sites, nonclinical sites, and outreach sites; the sites may be operated 
by a variety of organizations including state and local health departments, 
CBOs, and healthcare organizations. Testing at high-risk venues is 
particularly useful during an outbreak but is also useful before an outbreak 
occurs—when routine or targeted testing can help identify an increase in 
HIV or HCV cases. Regardless of the type of testing venue, the following 
testing principles should be followed:
■■ Testing should be voluntary (free from coercion).
■■ Clients should be informed of HIV or HCV testing and have the 
option to opt-out.
■■ Testing should maintain the confidentiality and privacy of the client. 
■■ All persons tested positive for HIV or HCV should be linked to care.
■■ Positive HIV and HCV test results should be reported to the health 
department, as required by local and state laws and regulations. 
Syringe services programs
Syringe services programs (SSPs) provide access to sterile needles and 
syringes. SSPs can provide a variety of other services, including HIV and 
HCV screening. Because SSPs primarily serve PWID, they are ideal sites for 
HIV and HCV testing among this population. In addition, the fact that many 
SSP clients are repeat clients allows multiple opportunities for testing. 
Jails and prisons
Each year, 24%–36% of persons who inject heroin are jailed or 
imprisoned.26 Rates of reincarceration are especially high for persons  
with substance use disorders. The repetitive imprisonment of persons with 
substance use disorders makes correctional facilities useful venues for HIV 
and HCV testing. Both routine and targeted testing of these populations  
can be used. Discussions of HIV and HCV testing and care—how to 
conduct testing, how to manage the care of infected persons, how to 
transfer a person’s care to a community provider upon release—should 
include on-site medical staff, community HIV and HCV clinical care 
providers, and local health department staff. Additionally, if a person was 
receiving HIV or HCV treatment before incarceration, a plan is needed to 
coordinate the treatment during incarceration with the care that had been 
provided in the community.
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Substance-use treatment facilities
Although the estimated percentages of PWID in substance-use treatment 
programs vary widely (1%–39% in large metropolitan areas25), these 
programs, by providing testing, can contribute to the prevention of HIV 
and HCV infections and to the care of infected persons:
■■ Testing provides an opportunity to address the role of drug use in 
increased risk of HIV and HCV infections.
■■ Substance-use treatment facilities can serve as an entry point to 
medical care for a person with HIV or HCV infection and can improve 
adherence to medical treatment regimens.
■■ Knowledge of a client’s HIV or HCV status can help providers 
of substance use treatment choose medications to help prevent 
interactions between the drugs used to treat substance use disorders 
and the medications used to treat HIV and HCV infection.
Substance-use treatment programs can be inpatient (in a hospital or a in a 
separate facility) or outpatient. Inpatient programs may be better equipped 
to provide testing. Outpatient substance-use treatment programs, many 
of which are operated by small CBOs, may need assistance from the local 
health department or a larger CBO focused on HIV and HCV testing. 
Methadone maintenance programs typically require daily or otherwise 
frequent contact with clients, including contact for intense behavioral 
counseling, and are thus ideally positioned to offer routine HIV and 
HCV testing at program intake, and to offer repeat testing for persons at 
continued risk of infection. 
Emergency departments
Emergency departments are useful as testing venues because HIV and 
HCV prevalence is high among persons who access care at emergency 
departments. According to the results of studies conducted in urban 
emergency departments, 0.1%–7.8% of emergency department populations 
are HIV-positive, and 10%–14% are HCV-positive.27–34 Emergency 
departments may offer rapid or laboratory-based HIV and HCV tests and 
provide results before the patient is discharged. Emergency departments 
may be part of a health system that has on-site clinics for HIV or HCV care, 
and may be able to refer to substance use treatment. 
Sexually transmitted disease clinics
Injecting drugs can reduce inhibitions and increase engagement in high-
risk sexual behaviors such as trading sex for drugs or money, sex with 
multiple partners, and sex without a condom. PWID, who are at increased 
risk of STIs, may seek treatment at STD clinics,35 which routinely perform 
HIV testing. During an HIV/HCV outbreak among PWID, risk-based HCV 
testing can be considered. In addition, all persons who test positive for HIV 
should be tested for HCV and HBV.21
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Other testing sites
Testing can also be conducted at non-fixed settings such as mobile outreach 
vans. Mobile outreach brings testing to PWID where they reside or where 
they can otherwise be found. Another testing venue to consider is homeless 
shelters. Persons experiencing homelessness are more likely to engage in 
behaviors, including injection drug use, which put them at higher risk of 
HIV and HCV infection.36,37 Lastly, an outbreak investigation might reveal 
other places where PWID congregate; these places can be considered as 
potential testing sites.
Testing in nonclinical settings
The following are important considerations and procedures for  
nonclinical sites:
■■ Familiarity with state and local laws regarding HIV counseling, use 
of rapid HIV tests, confirmatory testing of preliminary positive test 
results, informed consent, laboratory requirements, confidentiality, 
and training and authorization of health care personnel who may 
administer HIV tests and provide HIV counseling.
■■ Familiarity with state and local laws and regulations regarding 
reporting of HIV and HCV test results to the health department, and 
notification of sex or needle-sharing partners. Staff at nonclinical sites 
should have all forms and tools needed for reporting and notification.
■■ Determination of the certification needed to provide testing. For 
example, if the plan is to use waived rapid HIV tests, obtain a 
certificate of waiver under the Clinical Laboratory Improvements Act 
of 1988 (CLIA), or establish an agreement with a laboratory to work 
under its current CLIA certificate.
■■ Protocols for data security and confidentiality and quality assurance.
■■ Determination of training for nonmedical personnel who 
perform testing. Training should include specimen collection, test 
administration, reading of test results, documentation, quality control 
procedures, client interactions, patient privacy and confidentiality, and 
HIV and HCV test counseling procedures. 
■■ Consent: Clients whose behavior is significantly altered by the 
influence of drugs or alcohol cannot provide consent. 
■■ Provision of counseling and testing: Pretest- and posttest-counseling  
is not required (especially in persons who have tested for HIV  
and HCV before) but if provided, the counseling and testing should be 
conducted in a private location where client confidentiality can  
be ensured. 
■■ Confirmation of rapid HIV and HCV tests: A positive result from 
a rapid test requires confirmatory testing. The facility will need to 
have arrangements with a laboratory for confirmatory testing. If 
confirmatory tests are conducted at an outside laboratory, the site 
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should establish procedures for collection and transport of specimens, 
obtaining confirmatory results, and how to inform clients of the 
confirmatory test results. Alternatively, the facility can choose to 
immediately refer a person with one or more positive rapid tests 
result to a clinical provider. 
■■ Linkage to medical care: Establish relationships with local providers 
to quickly refer persons with an HIV or HCV diagnosis. (For more 
information about identifying HIV and HCV providers, see Chapter 13 
and Chapter 14)
(For more information about HIV testing in nonclinical settings, see https://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/testing/cdc_hiv_implementing_hiv_testing_in_
nonclinical_settings.pdf)
(For more information about HIV counseling and prevention, see https://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5019a1.htm)
(For more information about HIV testing laws and confidentiality see 
http://hivlawandpolicy.org/state-hiv-laws) 
Additional considerations for testing in jails and prisons
■■ Who to test: Although routine opt-out screening is the most 
comprehensive testing strategy, limited resources may restrict 
implementation. Other testing strategies include risk-based, clinical 
screening, demographic screening, or multiple approaches. During 
a local outbreak (in a population residing in a facility where routine 
testing is not conducted), risk-based screening enables focus on an 
affected population and the effective allocation of resources.
■■ When to test: Because many persons are released from jails within 
48–72 hours, the testing period is limited. Use of rapid tests and 
protocols for referring persons with preliminary positive rapid 
test results can be considered in jail settings. Because prison 
incarcerations tend to be longer, prison systems can test at the initial 
medical evaluation and can consider rapid and conventional lab-based 
testing strategies.
■■ Confidentiality: Maintaining the confidentiality of incarcerated persons 
is imperative to protect persons who test positive, particularly those 
who test positive for HIV. Concerns about privacy and fear of stigma 
prevent testing. Facility providers should be familiar with state and 
local laws regarding confidentiality and disclosure of an inmate’s 
status to public health authorities and others (e.g., parole officer, 
sexual or needle-sharing partners) and should inform inmates about 
confidentiality and reporting laws.
■■ Clinical care: Appropriate clinical care and support services should 
be provided to inmates with diagnosed HIV or HCV. Jail inmates 
may be released before they receive confirmatory test results, so it 
is important to promptly notify them of final test results; those who 
tested preliminary positive should be linked to care upon release. For 
longer-stay inmates, a post-release care plan should be developed.
Chapter 7 | Testing at venues frequented by people who inject drugs
Managing HIV and Hepatitis C Outbreaks Among People Who Inject Drugs—A Guide for State And Local Health Departments
33
(For more information about HIV and HCV testing in correctional facilities, 
see https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/group/cdc-hiv-correctional-settings-
guidelines.pdf and https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
rr5201a1.htm)
(For information about Tips and Tools for providing transitional care 
coordination, see https://careacttarget.org/library/tools-tips-providing-
transitional-care-coordination)
(For information about HIV testing laws and confidentiality, see http://
hivlawandpolicy.org/state-hiv-laws) 
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Chapter 8:  Overview of HIV laboratory testing and 
identification of acute infections
State or local health department HIV laboratory testing
Increased testing will be required to assess the full extent of the possible 
outbreak. Serologic screening and confirmation of HIV infection should 
be conducted by local or state health departments, using the algorithm 
recommended by CDC/Association of Public Health Laboratories (https://
stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/50872) (Figure 8-1).38 For health departments 
who do not have the resources to perform HIV diagnostic testing, CDC can 
assist in testing specimens.
Figure 8‑1: CDC recommendations for HIV testing in laboratories
 
Antigen/antibody immunoassay
The first serologic assay in the HIV testing algorithm is an antigen (Ag)/
antibody (Ab) test that can detect both the HIV-1 p24 gag antigen and 
antibodies to HIV proteins (step 1, Figure 8-1). Assays that can detect p24 
antigen allow for earlier detection of HIV because they can detect the virus 
before the body has mounted an immune response. During the eclipse 
period (the period between infection and the first detection of virus in the 
blood by any test, on average about 11 days after infection), no currently 
available test can diagnose infection. 
HIV-1/HIV-2 antibody differentiation immunoassay
Reactive specimens from Ag/Ab testing are tested with a supplemental 
assay that detects and differentiates HIV-1 and HIV-2 antibodies  
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(step 2, Figure 8-1). Specimens testing reactive for HIV antibodies in the 
supplemental assay are considered HIV-1, HIV-2 or HIV-positive depending 
on the specific seroreactivity observed in the test. Specimens testing 
negative or indeterminate in the supplemental test should be tested using 
an HIV-1 NAT to diagnose possible acute HIV-1 infection (step 3, Figure 
8-1). 
Persons with a negative HIV-1 NAT result (step 3, Figure 8-1) and an  
HIV-2 indeterminate result or an HIV indeterminate antibody differentiation 
immunoassay result (step 2, Figure 8-1), should be tested with a different 
validated supplemental HIV-2 test (antibody test or NAT) or the algorithm 
should be repeated in 2 to 4 weeks, starting with an Ag/Ab immunoassay.39 
HIV nucleic acid testing for specimens with negative antigen/antibody test 
results
To identify infection during the window period (period between HIV 
infection and when a test can reliably detect infection—this period 
includes the eclipse period), specimens that are nonreactive to an Ag/Ab 
immunoassay can be pooled and then further tested by a NAT.40–42 One 
approach is to pool HIV Ag/Ab-nonreactive specimens into intermediate 
pools of 16 specimens and then combine the 16 intermediate pools into a 
master pool of 256 specimens. Master pools are tested for HIV-1 RNA; if the 
result is positive, the individual specimens in the pool are tested. 
HIV point-of-care (rapid) testing
Point-of-care testing using Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved, 
CLIA-waived rapid HIV tests can be used to screen for infection. In an 
outbreak setting, the preferred specimen for rapid testing is fingerstick 
whole blood instead of oral fluid. Although rapid tests provide immediate 
results in the field, the sensitivity of rapid tests is lower than that of Ag/
Ab assays using plasma/serum.39,43–45 Preliminary positive rapid test results 
must be confirmed following the diagnostic algorithm recommended by 
CDC/Association of Public Health Laboratories (Figure 8-1) by either the 
organization conducting the rapid test or by another healthcare provider. 
Persons with preliminary positive rapid test results can be immediately 
linked to medical care; a person’s visit to a healthcare provider does not 
have to be delayed pending confirmatory testing. 
Serum/plasma is required for HIV Ag/Ab assays and for serologic 
screening for HCV. Serum/plasma is also needed for the HIV recency and 
phylogenetic testing performed at CDC (described below). 
Retesting for HIV during an outbreak
During an outbreak investigation, persons who initially tested negative, 
by any test, should be retested 3–6 weeks after the initial test.45 Re-testing 
can begin with rapid tests or with laboratory-based testing. Results of 
retests may identify infections that were missed because initial tests were 
performed during the window period.
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CDC HIV laboratory testing
Testing for recent HIV infection and determining whether those infections 
are genetically linked is important for characterization of the potential 
outbreak and for determination of public health prevention strategies.17 
Determining new infections and transmission links can also provide helpful 
information on transmission dynamics (who is infecting whom and how) 
and the effectiveness of specific interventions. In general, “recent infection” 
is defined by a laboratory-based recency assay and usually occurs within 6 
months of infection but this timeframe depends on the recency assay used. 
Laboratory assistance from CDC
The Laboratory Branch, Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, CDC can assist 
an outbreak investigation as follows:
■■ Determine whether HIV infections are recent (new, or incident) or 
longstanding (prevalent, or long-term) by using antibody avidity-
based serologic recency assays. 
■■ Perform HIV sequencing on plasma/serum specimens, and analyze 
HIV sequences to 
■■ determine whether viral transmission linkages are internal to 
the outbreak (between persons in the outbreak) or external to 
the outbreak by comparing the sequences with local and global 
reference sequences
■■ identify recency of infections by comparing sequences from 
persons in the investigation. If two or more sequences share 
nucleotide identities < 0.5% this can indicate recent and rapid 
transmission since little time has elapsed for the viruses to have 
measurably evolved
■■ identify evidence of antiretroviral drug resistance, which can 
complicate treatment strategies
Combining the results of these analyses with contact-tracing and other 
epidemiologic and laboratory data (e.g., viral load, CD4 count) can 
enhance understanding of outbreak transmission (HIV and HCV) and thus 
contribute to effective prevention efforts. 
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Chapter 9:  Overview of hepatitis C virus laboratory 
testing and cluster investigations 
The epidemiology of HCV infection in PWID communities will usually be 
characterized as either: (1) recent introduction of a single HCV strain into 
the community or (2) ongoing transmission with repeated introduction 
of HCV infections into the community. HCV laboratory testing during an 
outbreak prioritizes the detection of new HCV cases. 
Detection of acute infections
During an investigation of a suspected HCV outbreak among PWID, 
the CDC testing guidance for identifying HCV infections in the general 
population (https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6218a5.
htm) should be supplemented by testing HCV antibody–negative specimens 
using a pooled NAT technique (as described for HIV infection in Chapter 
8). This will identify persons during the acute phase of HCV infection, 
before the development of HCV antibodies (Figure 9-1).
Identification of transmission clusters
The suggested HCV testing algorithm during a suspected or ongoing HCV 
outbreak among PWID involves pooled NAT techniques, next-generation 
sequencing (NGS), and use of CDC’s Global Hepatitis Outbreak and 
Surveillance Technology (GHOST), a cloud-based, public health research 
tool. After HCV antibody–positive and antibody-negative specimens have 
been tested by NAT, all reactive NAT (positive) specimens are tested 
using NGS and GHOST for detection of cases sharing similar HCV strains 
and for the identification and visualization of transmission networks 
(Figure 9-1). All reactive NAT specimens collected during a suspected 
outbreak investigation can be submitted to CDC for NGS/GHOST testing. 
Alternatively, state public health laboratories equipped with NGS can use 
GHOST after receiving the required training. (For more information about 
GHOST and training required to access GHOST, see Appendix C)
Figure 9‑1: Suggested HCV testing algorithm during  
a suspected HCV outbreak among PWID
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Laboratory testing for ongoing transmission with continual  
HCV introduction
In PWID communities with a history of HCV infection, NGS/GHOST testing, 
using only HCV antibody–positive specimens and repeat serologic testing 
may be considered (Figure 9-2). In PWID communities with established 
HCV infection, molecular investigation is focused on identification of HCV 
transmission network(s) to facilitate targeted public health interventions. If 
possible, persons who test HCV antibody-positive should be followed-up 
with testing by GHOST; persons who test HCV antibody-negative should 
receive a second test for HCV antibody or NAT a few months after the 
initial negative result. If resources allow, persons previously tested reactive 
by GHOST should have follow-up GHOST testing to identify re-infection 
with new HCV strains.
Figure 9‑2: Suggested HCV testing algorithm during ongoing  
transmission and continuous HCV introduction among PWID
Follow-up testing
In general, PWID communities (expected to be at high risk of HCV 
infection and reinfection) should be monitored to identify new infections. 
Whenever possible, monitoring should include follow-up testing of persons 
with nonreactive NAT (negative) results depending on the estimated risk of 
HCV infection, population size, and available resources. If an HCV outbreak 
is evident (multiple persons diagnosed with acute infection), the follow-
up interval for testing PWID with HCV antibody-negative or nonreactive 
NAT results should be short (e.g., 1–2 months). If an HCV outbreak is not 
evident (few or no persons are identified with acute infections), the follow-
up interval for testing PWID with HCV antibody-negative or nonreactive 
NAT results may be longer (e.g., 6 months).
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Outbreak response 
Chapter 10: Management structure
Incident Command System 
For complex outbreaks or outbreaks that involve multiple jurisdictions or 
agencies, health departments can consider using an Incident Command 
System (ICS) to manage the outbreak response. An ICS facilitates 
coordination during an outbreak by using a common organizational 
structure (i.e., clearly defined roles and responsibilities) and terminology 
(Figure 10-1).
Figure 10‑1: General Incident Command System organization
Incident Commander
The incident commander has overall responsibility and authority for the 
response. The incident commander directs and manages all response 
operations, develops response objectives, and approves response plans. The 
incident commander also defines the organization of the ICS by determining 
which command posts and functional sections are required for the response 
and by designating persons to perform those functions. Roles not designated 
by the incident commander are assumed by the incident commander. 
Command Staff 
The command staff is designated to carry out staff functions needed to 
support the incident commander. The command staff typically comprises 
a public information officer, a liaison officer, and a safety officer but may 
include others as required and assigned by the incident commander.
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Public Information Officer
The public information officer develops and releases accurate, accessible, 
and timely information about the incident to the news media, response 
staff, and partner organizations. The public information officer determines, 
according to the direction of the incident commander, limits on the release 
of information and keeps an eye on media information that may be useful 
in response planning.
Safety Officer
The safety officer recommends and establishes measures for ensuring staff 
health and safety. The safety officer also develops a site safety plan and 
reviews response plans for safety implications. 
Liaison Officer
The liaison officer is the point of contact for assisting and coordinating 
activities between the incident commander and other agencies and groups. 
The liaison officer also develops and maintains a list of partner agencies 
and their representatives and monitors incident operations to identify 
current or potential interagency conflicts.
Other command staff personnel
Depending on the nature of the response, additional responders may be 
needed. These responders, typically part of the command staff, may include 
agency representatives and technical specialists.
Agency Representatives
An agency representative, a person assigned (from another agency) to 
support the response, should be authorized to make decisions on behalf of 
the parent agency in matters that directly affect the agency’s involvement in 
the response. 
Technical Specialists
Some responses may require the use of technical specialists who have 
specific skills pertinent to the response. Technical specialists may be 
assigned wherever their services are needed. 
General Staff
The general staff is responsible for the functional aspects of the response 
(e.g., planning, logistics, finance, and administration). Each of these 
responsibilities remains with the incident commander until delegated to 
another person. When response operations, planning, logistics, and finance 
and administration are established as separate functions under the incident 
commander, they are managed by a section chief and can be supported by 
other functional units. 
Operations section
The Operations section conducts all activities directly relevant to the 
response and is responsible for implementing response strategies. 
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Operations can comprise multiple groups and functions and can span 
multiple components of an agency. 
Planning section
The Planning section collects, evaluates, and disseminates strategic 
response information. The Planning section supervises the preparation of 
the response plan, develops situation reports and executive summaries, 
establishes information requirements and reporting schedules, and schedules 
tactics and planning meetings throughout the response. The Planning 
section is also responsible for the management of incident documentation 
and tracking of resources.
Logistics section and Finance and Administrative section
The Logistics section provides all materials, services, and facilities. 
The Finance and Administrative section is responsible for all financial, 
administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the response, including ensuring 
that response plans operate within the financial limits of the response. 
Modular structure of ICS
The organizational flexibility of an ICS allows adaptation to match the 
size and complexity of the incident. Response efforts can be expanded or 
contracted, and only the parts of the structure that best meet the needs of 
the response are activated. For example, some responses will not require 
activation of the Planning, Logistics, or Finance and Administration sections; 
other responses require activation of some or all of these sections. 
Unified Command
Although a single incident commander typically leads a response, the ICS 
can be expanded into a unified command. In general, a unified command 
is established for multijurisdictional responses or for responses that require 
resources from multiple agencies. Jurisdictions may differ by geographic 
area (e.g., 2 or more counties or states), governmental level (e.g., local, 
state or federal), or functional responsibility (e.g., public health, medical 
care, law enforcement). A unified command usually consists of the incident 
commanders and other agency representatives (who have the authority to 
make decisions regarding their agency’s participation), who work together 
to form a single command structure. These persons are jointly responsible 
for the management and direction of response activities (e.g., development 
and implementation of objectives and strategies, integration of agency 
operations, planning for tactical activities, and commitment of resources). 
(For more information about the ICS, see https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/
is/icsresource/index.htm)
(For an example of how an ICS was adapted for use during an HIV/HCV 
outbreak response, see Appendix D)
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Chapter 11: Engaging law enforcement 
Public health and law enforcement partnerships 
Law enforcement officials (LEOs) (e.g., sheriff and police department 
officers and staff, county or jurisdictional prosecutors), who are often  
aware of substance use patterns in the local community, can provide 
valuable assistance in identifying and addressing an HIV or HCV outbreak 
among PWID. 
Health department-LEO relationships are mutually beneficial. For example, 
health officials can provide sharps containers, tongs, and gloves to prevent 
accidental needle sticks and in some jurisdictions health officials can 
provide first-responders with naloxone for rapid response in situations 
involving an acute overdose. LEOs can help health officials develop safety 
plans. The following are examples of beneficial partnerships between 
public health officials and LEOs.
Community assessment 
LEOs can provide an overview of the PWID communities in the outbreak 
area and assist in linking cases and supporting epidemiologic investigations. 
Engaging key community stakeholders 
LEOs can assist in identifying and engaging key community partners who 
may be able to encourage PWID engagement in public health interventions 
such as HIV and HCV testing, linkage to care, and participation in SSPs. 
In addition, staff members from SSPs—by offering to pick up publicly 
discarded syringes, a service that LEOs are often asked to perform—can 
build LEOs’ support for SSPs.
Testing, treatment, and linkage-to-care during incarceration and at reentry 
to the community 
Public health officials can work with LEOs to ensure that jails and state 
prisons have HIV and HCV testing and treatment plans and that these sites 
have linkage-to-care plans for persons reentering the community.
Incarceration and reentry 
Public health officials can advise jails and prisons about how to maintain 
the confidentiality of inmates with HIV or HCV. To prevent stigma and 
mistreatment, it is important to maintain confidentiality regarding an 
inmate’s positive HIV or HCV status. Special care should be exercised when 
dispensing medications. During reentry to the community, it is important 
to ensure that the public health care coordinator work with the person to 
ensure continuity of medical and other care services. 
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SSPs
LEOs can encourage PWID to engage with an SSP, thus helping develop 
trust in the work of the LEOs and that of the SSP. Providing information 
and encouragement to PWID is important in ensuring the success of newly 
established SSPs. 
The North Carolina Harm Reduction Coalition has published a 2-page 
infographic entitled Law Enforcement Guide to Syringe Exchange 
Programs. Although the infographic is tailored to the needs of LEOs, it can 
be modified to meet the needs of a specific community (http://www.nchrc.
org/assets/Syringe-Exchange-resources/LEO-Syringe-Exchange.pdf).
Engaging field staff 
Productivity and staff safety benefit when street-assigned police officers, 
DIS, and community health workers know one another. For example, if 
DIS are conducting contact tracing and are in the home of a PWID during 
a search or an arrest, it is helpful for LEOs to know that the DIS are public 
health officials. 
Establishment of a security plan 
LEOs can assist in establishing operations and safety protocols in the 
incident command center, SSPs, testing sites, and other prevention sites to 
ensure the safety of staff and participants. 
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Chapter 12:  Role of community-based organizations 
and community partners 
Community-based organizations (CBOs)
A CBO is a public or private nonprofit organization that is representative 
of a community or a significant segment of a community and that 
provides education or related services to persons in the community. CBOs 
complement the HIV and HCV prevention efforts of state and local health 
departments by providing prevention services, education, and outreach. 
CBOs are particularly useful in engaging hard to reach populations (e.g., 
PWID; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons; homeless persons). 
During an outbreak, CBOs can provide services that may be beyond the 
capacity of local and state health departments. For example, CBOs may be 
able to provide mobile HIV and HCV testing, hepatitis A and hepatitis B 
vaccination, linkage-to-care services for persons with recently diagnosed 
infection, and risk-reduction services (e.g., operation of an SSP where 
allowed by law). Because CBO services can overlap with prevention 
and health care services offered by other public health and health care 
providers, coordination between CBOs and public health providers is 
necessary to ensure that evidence-based interventions are being used and 
that outbreak-response goals are met in accordance with the outbreak 
response plan. In addition, when CBOs are used to augment HIV or 
HCV testing during an outbreak, mechanisms should be in place for the 
immediate reporting of positive test results to the health department.
Before an outbreak, health departments should identify local CBOs, 
understand the services they provide, and establish a plan for CBO 
assistance. Health departments may establish an MOU with CBOs and may 
identify a contractual funding source to pay for CBO assistance during 
an outbreak. The MOU should detail the services the CBO is expected to 
provide, the duration of the commitment, and the expectation that the 
CBO abide by the health policies, laws, and regulations of the state and 
local jurisdiction. 
Including CBO staff in health department trainings and outbreak exercises 
can increase CBOs’ preparedness and help prevent inefficiencies and 
redundancy of service delivery during an outbreak. 
Community partners
Partnerships with local community partners (e.g., local clinics, hospitals, 
pharmacies, universities) can help ensure that additional resources and 
personnel are available to assist during an outbreak.
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Chapter 13: Coordinating HIV care and treatment 
For persons with diagnosed HIV infection, linkage-to-care offers 
antiretroviral therapy (recommended for all persons with diagnosed HIV), 
which provides health benefits and decreases the possibility of further 
transmission. Persons in care are offered additional behavioral support 
(e.g., risk-reductions interventions to further reduce transmission).46
Although HIV care and treatment may be specialized, HIV care can be 
managed by various providers: infectious disease specialist, internist, 
family medicine practitioner, or pediatrician.47 Under a comprehensive care 
model, one physician provides HIV and primary care. In settings without 
HIV experts, it is advisable for a provider who is new to HIV treatment 
to consult with an HIV specialist to establish best practices for evaluating 
patients, choosing antiretroviral therapy, determining frequency of 
medical visits, selecting appropriate laboratory monitoring, and providing 
prophylaxis and treatment of opportunistic infections. Clinical consultation 
is available from the National Clinician Consultation Center (http://nccc.
ucsf.edu/) or at (800) 933-3413. 
Guidelines for treatment of persons living with HIV, including guidelines 
for antiretroviral treatment of adults and adolescents, antiretroviral 
treatment of children, antiretroviral treatment of pregnant women and 
prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission, and guidelines for 
treatment and prophylaxis of opportunistic infections for adults and for 
children are available at AIDSinfo (https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/).
HIV program staff in most state health departments are aware of the 
network of local HIV care providers to whom they can refer persons. 
During an outbreak, other services besides direct medical care may be 
needed including medical case management, substance abuse treatment, 
mental health treatment and assistance procuring health care coverage. If 
an HIV/HCV outbreak occurs in a part of the state without specific HIV 
health care or support services, a creative approach will be needed to 
identify available local care and treatment services that can be supported 
by HIV medical provider experts outside the immediate region. Resources 
to improve HIV service capacity are available; becoming familiar with 
these resources prior to an outbreak will help jurisdictions expand services 
more quickly.
(For Recommendations for HIV prevention with Adults and Adolescents 
with HIV, see https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/44064) 
Where to find HIV care providers and training resources
Before or during an outbreak, health departments can locate HIV care 
and treatment services in their state and develop capacity in areas where 
needed. The following are sources of HIV care and treatment service 
providers and resources for increasing the capacity of HIV care providers:
■■ The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) HIV/AIDS 
Bureau Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program (https://findhivcare.hrsa.gov/
index.html) can help persons living with HIV access medical care 
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through an online locator that includes doctors and clinics. 
■■ The HRSA Bureau of Primary Health Care’s Health Center Program 
(https://findahealthcenter.hrsa.gov/) can help persons living with HIV 
access medical care through an online locator that includes doctors 
and clinics. 
■■ The National Clinician Consultation Center (http://nccc.ucsf.edu/) 
works to improve patient health outcomes by building the capacity 
of health care providers through expert clinical consultation 
and education. The center includes experienced HIV-treatment 
physicians, clinical pharmacists, nurses, and nurse practitioners 
from the University of California, San Francisco, who provide rapid 
expert consultation on the management of HIV/AIDS, perinatal HIV, 
preexposure prophylaxis, and the management of postexposure 
prophylaxis for HIV, HBV, and HCV. 
■■ The HIV Medicine Association (http://www.hivma.org/Home.aspx), 
an organization of medical professionals who practice HIV medicine, 
maintains an online directory of members who are accepting  
new patients. 
■■ The American Academy of HIV Medicine (http://aahivm.org/Default.
aspx) provides credentialing for practicing clinicians (HIV Specialist), 
non-practicing clinicians (HIV Expert), and eligible HIV-specialized 
pharmacists (HIV Pharmacist). The academy maintains a directory of 
certified specialists. The academy also provides educational resources 
for clinicians including workshops and webinars.
■■ The AIDS Education and Training Center (https://aidsetc.org/about) is 
the training arm of the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program. The center is 
a national network of HIV experts who provide locally based, tailored 
education, clinical consultation, and technical assistance to health care 
professionals (both prescribing and non-prescribing providers such 
as case managers) and health care organizations. The training centers 
can provide instruction to health care providers with no experience 
treating patients with HIV through education and mentoring programs 
such as through Project Echo models.
Health Care Coverage for HIV care
Health care coverage for HIV related provider visits, laboratory monitoring, 
and monthly medications is important. Typical options include public 
health care coverage (e.g., Medicaid or Medicare) and private insurance; 
for persons who have neither, HIV care can be accessed through the Ryan 
White HIV/AIDS Program.
The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program, administered by the HRSA HIV/AIDS 
Bureau, funds and coordinates with cities, states, and local community-
based organizations to deliver HIV care, treatment, and support for low-
income persons living with HIV. The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program 
statute indicates that the program is the “payor of last resort” which means 
that Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program funds can only be used for services 
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not covered by other federal or state programs, or private insurance. The 
majority of Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program funds support primary medical 
care and essential support services. A smaller but equally important portion 
is used to fund technical assistance, clinical training, and the development 
of innovative models of care. HRSA also administers the Community Health 
Center Program which provides primary health care, including HIV care. 
The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program AIDS Drug Assistance Program 
(ADAP), a state and territory-administered program, provides FDA-approved 
medications to low-income persons living with HIV who have limited or 
no health coverage from private insurance, Medicaid, or Medicare. ADAP 
serves as an important source of ongoing access to HIV medications. ADAP 
funds may also be used to purchase health insurance for eligible persons 
and for services that enhance access to, adherence to, and monitoring of 
prescription medication. 
Many pharmaceutical companies have patient-assistance programs that 
provide prescription medications at no charge for qualifying persons. A 
case manager or pharmacist experienced at securing medications through 
these programs can assist the clinical provider.
(For more information about the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program, see 
https://hab.hrsa.gov/about-ryan-white-hivaids-program/about-ryan-white-
hivaids-program)
(For more information about HRSA’s Community Health Center Program, 
see https://bphc.hrsa.gov/about/)
The HIV care team
Ideally, the HIV care team includes an HIV-expert who manages the 
patient’s HIV primary care needs and identifies needs for subspecialty care, 
but the team can be managed by a variety of providers who consult with 
HIV experts through referrals or by co-management via telehealth. Other 
specialists may be needed to manage comorbidities such as HBV, HCV, 
malignancies, heart disease, metabolic disorders, mental illnesses, substance 
use disorders, and obstetric-gynecologic care. Dental (oral health) care is 
also an important component of HIV care. 
(For information about HIV clinical care guidelines and resources, see 
https://hab.hrsa.gov/clinical-quality-management/clinical-care-guidelines-
and-resources)
Care coordination
In clinics, the HIV care team should include staff to help coordinate care. 
These staff might include case managers, social workers and patient 
navigators. Although roles for various care coordination staff might differ 
between jurisdictions, staff should be designated to assist the following: 
■■ Maintaining communication with other providers to coordinate access 
to psychosocial support, reproductive and gynecologic services, 
alcohol or drug treatment, medication-assistance programs, prevention 
counseling, and other services 
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■■ Support access to social services, including housing, transportation, 
mental health, and legal assistance
■■ Linkage to HIV care and support to help keep persons engaged  
in care
Medication management
Persons should begin antiretroviral therapy as soon as possible after 
diagnosis. Because adherence to antiretroviral therapy is critical to 
achieving HIV viral suppression, the care team should regularly identify 
barriers to adherence and provide adherence support. Adherence support 
can be provided by multiple members of the care team including, nurses, 
case managers, peer educators, and pharmacists.
Guidelines for antiretroviral therapy provide a comprehensive schedule 
for laboratory monitoring during antiretroviral therapy. Before therapy, a 
set of tests, readily available from most commercial laboratories, should 
be performed. Ideally, the results of an HIV medication–resistance test 
are known before treatment begins. However, a regimen, selected in 
consultation with an expert HIV provider and based on resistance patterns 
in the community, can be started before the results are known and if 
necessary, adjusted in response to the test results.
Medication management is critical for primary HIV care. In many 
comprehensive HIV clinics, a clinical pharmacist with HIV expertise works 
alongside other service providers to assist with medication management, 
including identification of drug-drug interactions, support of patient 
adherence, and reconciliation of medication profiles. In settings without an 
HIV-expert clinical pharmacist, consultation can be sought through a Ryan 
White HIV/AIDS Program clinic or another HIV care provider.
It is prudent for the provider to establish a relationship with one or 
more community pharmacists who will dispense antiretroviral and other 
medications and monitor refills, provide adherence support, patient 
education, and reconcile medications. The pharmacist can identify 
medication-related problems in the community, and provide ongoing 
feedback to the provider.
Considerations for medication management for PWID
Conventional antiretroviral therapy includes medications that are taken 
once or twice daily. For some regimens, a single fixed-dose combination 
tablet is all that is needed. PWID may experience adverse effects from 
antiretroviral therapy because of underlying hepatic, renal, neurologic, 
psychiatric, gastrointestinal, and hematologic disorders; these comorbid 
conditions need to be considered when selecting antiretroviral medications 
for this population. Other considerations for PWID are drug-drug 
interactions with medications used for substance use treatment (e.g., 
methadone, buprenorphine). Additionally, for HCV co-infected persons, 
it is important to consider drug-drug interactions between medications 
for HCV infection and antiretroviral therapy. Assistance from an HIV-
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expert physician or HIV-expert pharmacist may be needed: many drug-
drug interactions are complex and continue to evolve as new medications 
become available.
(For the Guidelines for the Use of Antiretroviral Agents in HIV-1-Infected 
Adults and Adolescents, see https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/contentfiles/
lvguidelines/adultandadolescentgl.pdf) 
(For the Guidelines for the Prevention and Treatment of Opportunistic 
Infections in HIV-Infected Adults and Adolescents, see https://aidsinfo.nih.
gov/guidelines/html/4/adult-and-adolescent-oi-prevention-and-treatment-
guidelines/0)
Adherence considerations for PWID
Adherence to antiretroviral therapy is critical to achieving sustained HIV 
viral suppression, improved overall health and survival, reduced risk of 
drug resistance and reduced risk of transmission to others.48 Adherence 
to antiretroviral therapy can be a challenge when treating a person who 
continues to use illicit drugs. However, antiretroviral therapy reduces 
morbidity and mortality even when adherence is suboptimal.48 Substance 
abuse, mental illness, or other psychosocial problems should therefore not 
be considered a contraindication to starting antiretroviral therapy. Instead, 
the care team should include adherence support or referrals should be 
made for supportive services (e.g., substance abuse treatment, mental 
health treatment, case management) to address barriers to adherence.48 
Some PWID experience structural barriers to adherence related to 
homelessness. Although homeless persons, in general, may be at greater 
risk of antiretroviral therapy nonadherence, many can achieve levels of 
adherence comparable with those of the housed population and can 
benefit from antiretroviral therapy even if adherence is suboptimal.49,50 
HIV care providers who have cultural competency with PWID can develop 
strategies to promote medication adherence (CDC’s Compendium of 
Evidence-Based Interventions and Best Practices for HIV Prevention 
includes effective adherence interventions). Lastly, directly administered 
antiretroviral therapy (persons are observed while taking their medications) 
may be beneficial for PWID.
(For more information about CDC’s Compendium of Evidence-Based 
Interventions and Best Practices for HIV Prevention, see https://www.cdc.
gov/hiv/research/interventionresearch/compendium/index.html) 
(For information about the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program’s Special 
Projects of National Significance which provide models of care and specific 
interventions, see https://hab.hrsa.gov/about-ryan-white-hivaids-program/
previous-spns-initiatives) 
Immunizations for persons living with HIV
Detailed information about immunizations for HIV-infected adults including 
PWID can be found at: https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/guidelines/html/4/
adult-and-adolescent-oi-prevention-and-treatment-guidelines/365/figure--
immunization. All PWID should be vaccinated against hepatitis A,  
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hepatitis B, and tetanus if not immune or previously vaccinated. Live-
attenuated vaccines should not be given to HIV-infected persons except 
under special circumstances. Other vaccines may be administered if the 
CD4+ cell count is >200 cells/µL.
Frequency of clinic follow-up 
Guidelines for the frequency of monitoring laboratory tests and clinic 
follow-up can be found at: https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/contentfiles/
lvguidelines/adultandadolescentgl.pdf. Continued viral suppression requires 
long-term retention in HIV care and adherence to antiretroviral therapy. 
Support services may be provided by care coordination staff. Attendance at 
clinic visits should be tracked through electronic health records, and a plan 
should be operationalized to provide reminders and follow-up for persons 
who miss visits.
Notes from the field
In Indiana, HIV-infected PWID may be eligible for HIV related services from the Indiana State 
Department of Health through Ryan White Parts A, B, and C funded programs, including 
ADAP. Linkage-to-care begins with care coordination programs in 22 locations in all 12 
jurisdictions across the state. Care coordinators, funded by the state, are embedded in SSPs. 
Care coordinators refer persons to HIV medical and support services and provide help 
accessing insurance premium and copay/deductible assistance. Care and treatment can 
include physician visits, medications, lab tests, and outpatient support services. Partner 
testing and counseling are also made available. Indiana has a decades-old high-risk pool 
insurance program (Health Indiana Plan 2.0), which was expanded through a Medicaid 
waiver in 2015. Care sites enroll persons through patient navigator services. 
Depending on a patient’s health coverage, medication assisted treatment for substance 
use disorders may be available through HIV Medical Services. Close partnerships with the 
designated state agency for mental health and substance-use-disorder programming 
and funding (Family Social Services Administration in Indiana) is key to a successful, 
comprehensive response. 
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Chapter 14:  Coordinating hepatitis C virus care  
and treatment 
Ensuring that HCV-infected persons are linked to care and begin curative 
direct acting antiviral (DAA) therapy is critical for reducing HCV-associated 
morbidity and mortality, and for reducing additional transmission risk. 
The American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases (AASLD) and 
the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) recommend treatment 
for all persons with chronic HCV infection, except those with short life 
expectancies that cannot be remediated by treatment or transplantation.51 
For persons with ongoing HCV transmission risk factors such as injection 
drug use, it is essential that they be linked to care with an addiction 
specialist or risk-reduction counseling services. 
HCV care and treatment, although somewhat specialized, can be managed 
by a variety of providers (e.g., gastroenterologists, hepatologists, infectious 
disease specialists, or primary care providers). Depending on the individual 
provider and the clinical model used, HCV care can be provided in whole 
or in part in a primary care or a specialty setting. Some practices may have 
developed a primary care and specialist co-management model. 
(For the AASLD-IDSA treatment guidance for persons living with HCV, 
including guidance for initial treatment, retreatment of persons in whom 
prior HCV treatment has failed, and guidance for persons with HIV-HCV 
coinfection, decompensated cirrhosis, see http://www.hcvguidelines.org/) 
(For Recommendations for Prevention and Control of HCV infection and 
HCV-Related Chronic Disease, see https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/
rr4719.pdf) 
Where to find HCV care providers and training resources
Before or during an outbreak, health departments can locate HCV care  
and treatment services in their state and develop capacity in areas  
where needed. The following are sources of HCV care and treatment 
service providers:
■■ The American Liver Foundation has an online directory of health 
care providers and treatment facilities, including health clinics and 
substance-use-treatment clinics with capacity to evaluate and treat 
persons with liver disorders (http://hepc.liverfoundation.org/find-a-
healthcare-provider/). 
■■ HRSA Bureau of Primary Health Care’s Health Center Program 
(https://findahealthcenter.hrsa.gov/) can help persons living with 
HCV access medical care through an online locator that includes 
doctors and clinics. 
■■ State and local health departments may have a viral hepatitis 
prevention coordinator, who may be a resource for identifying clinics 
and providers in their jurisdictions (https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/
partners/hepatitiscoordslist.htm). 
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Health Care Coverage for HCV care
Health care coverage for HCV related provider visits, laboratory monitoring, 
and medications is important. Typical options include public health 
care coverage (e.g., Medicaid or Medicare) and private insurance. Case 
management services are important for helping low-income or uninsured 
HCV-infected persons obtain health care coverage for primary care and 
HCV care and treatment. Pharmaceutical companies have patient-assistance 
programs that can provide prescription medications at no charge for 
qualifying persons. A case manager or pharmacist experienced at securing 
medications through these programs can assist the clinical provider.
HCV care
HCV care and treatment can be delivered by a subspecialist or primary 
care provider. This will likely be influenced by factors such as the 
complexity of the patient’s liver disease, provider’s familiarity with HCV 
care and treatment, insurance reimbursement policies, and clinic practices 
and policies. Telehealth programs have been used in under-resourced 
areas to connect primary care providers with HCV specialists to assist 
management of HCV care and treatment. Other specialists may be needed 
to manage comorbidities such as HIV, HBV, other chronic liver diseases 
(e.g., cirrhosis), malignancies, kidney disease, metabolic disorders, mental 
illnesses, and substance use disorders.
Care coordination
Available care coordination services for persons with HCV vary by clinic, 
locality, and state. Care coordination staff might include case managers, 
social workers and patient navigators. Although the breadth of services may 
vary, care coordination services may include: 
■■ Maintaining communication with other providers to coordinate access 
to psychosocial support, reproductive and gynecologic services, 
alcohol or drug treatment, medication-assistance programs, prevention 
counseling, and other services
■■ Support access to social services, including housing, transportation, 
mental health, and legal assistance
■■ Linkage to HCV care and support to help keep persons engaged  
in care 
Medication management
Persons with chronic HCV infection should begin DAA therapy as soon as 
possible after diagnosis (ideally, persons with new infections should be 
monitored for spontaneous clearance for a minimum of 6 months before 
DAA therapy is initiated). The AASLD-IDSA guidelines for HCV treatment 
provide a comprehensive schedule for laboratory monitoring during DAA 
therapy.51 Before therapy, the severity of liver fibrosis should be assessed. 
Persons with moderate or severe hepatic impairment (Child-Turcotte-Pugh 
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B or C) should be referred to a health care provider with expertise in that 
condition and ideally to a transplant center. DAA therapy is typically given 
for 8–12 weeks. Sustained virologic response (or cure) should be assessed 
12 weeks following the completion of the DAA treatment course.51 
It is prudent for the provider to establish a relationship with one or 
more community pharmacists who will dispense DAA therapy and other 
medications and monitor refills, provide adherence support, patient 
education, and reconcile medications. The pharmacist can identify 
medication-related problems in the community, and provide ongoing 
feedback to the provider.
Considerations for medication management for HIV/HCV  
co-infected persons
For HIV/HCV co-infected persons, it is important to consider drug-drug 
interactions between DAAs and antiretroviral therapy. Assistance from an 
HIV-expert physician or HIV-expert pharmacist may be needed: many drug-
drug interactions are complex and continue to evolve as new medications 
become available.
Considerations for medication management in an outbreak setting
Differentiating acute versus chronic HCV infection in an outbreak setting 
is important for determining the care of an individual patient. If acute 
HCV infection is suspected because of a possible exposure or clinical 
presentation, HCV antibody and HCV RNA testing are recommended. In 
approximately 20% of persons with acute HCV infection, the infection 
clears spontaneously.51 Spontaneous clearance generally occurs within 6 
months after the estimated time of infection.51 Persons with spontaneous 
clearance should not be treated with DAA therapy. 
Given the possibility of spontaneous clearance after acute infection and the 
high efficacy of DAA therapy for treating chronic HCV infection, AASLD-
IDSA recommends that persons be monitored for spontaneous clearance 
for a minimum of 6 months before DAA therapy is initiated.51 
In some situations, however, clinicians and public health officials may 
consider that the preventive benefits of early treatment outweigh the 
benefits of waiting for spontaneous clearance of the virus. These situations 
can include prevention of ongoing transmission (e.g., outbreak among 
PWID) or mitigation of severe clinical consequences. There are few data 
on the benefit of treating acute HCV infection with DAA therapy versus 
the benefit of delaying treatment initiation to monitor for spontaneous 
clearance of infection. As such, per expert opinion, if a decision is made 
to initiate HCV treatment during the acute phase, HCV RNA should be 
monitored for at least 12–16 weeks before treatment begins to allow for 
the possibility of spontaneous clearance.51 Finally, these persons should be 
linked to addiction specialists and risk reduction counseling, if appropriate. 
(For guidelines on the initial treatment of HCV infection, see http://www.
hcvguidelines.org/full-report/initial-treatment-hcv-infection) 
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(For the management of acute HCV infection, see http://www.
hcvguidelines.org/full-report/management-acute-hcv-infection) 
Considerations for PWID
Adherence to DAA therapy is essential to maximizing the benefit of curative 
HCV therapies. Persons whose substance use disorder is under control 
or in remission may be able to adhere to treatment well. Persons who 
continue to use illicit drugs require special consideration in terms of HCV 
treatment and prevention. All persons with HCV infection and ongoing 
substance use should be linked to an addiction specialist or risk-reduction 
counseling services. Some health plans require documentation of substance 
use counseling or a period of abstinence from drug and alcohol use before 
DAA therapy begins. For PWID, these requirements may constitute barriers 
to treatment access. 
Although DAA therapy is highly efficacious and curative, successful 
treatment for HCV infection does not result in immunity from future 
infections; therefore, persons who continue to engage in risky behaviors 
are at risk of reinfection. The risk of reinfection should be considered 
when counseling PWID about HCV treatment and prevention. The risk of 
reinfection also underscores the importance of ensuring that PWID receive 
adequate addiction or risk reduction services to maximize the benefit of 
DAA therapy. 
Immunizations for persons living with HCV
All persons with HCV infection who are susceptible to hepatitis A and 
hepatitis B infection should be vaccinated. Persons with cirrhosis should be 
vaccinated against pneumococcal infection. 
(For the Advisory Committee for Immunization Practice guidelines for 
hepatitis A, hepatitis B, and pneumococcal vaccinations, see https://www.
cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/hepa.html, https://www.cdc.
gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/hepb.html, and https://www.cdc.
gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/pneumo.html)
Frequency of Clinic Follow-up 
A quantitative HCV RNA viral load and other laboratory tests (complete 
blood count, creatinine, estimated glomerular filtration rate, hepatic panel) 
should be performed four weeks after starting DAA therapy.51 Additional 
clinical and laboratory monitoring may be required based on the specific 
DAA regimen, medical comorbidities, or other clinical indications. Virologic 
response should be assessed by a quantitative HCV RNA viral load test 
12 weeks after the completion of DAA therapy.51 A sustained virologic 
response indicates that the patient is cured of the HCV infection. Persons 
with advanced fibrosis/cirrhosis, including those with sustained virologic 
response, will continue to require endoscopic screening for esophageal 
varices and periodic screening for hepatocellular carcinoma after 
completion of DAA therapy. 
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Sustained virologic response requires adherence to DAA therapy: support 
services may be provided by care coordinators or patient navigators in the 
community. Attendance at clinic visits should be tracked through electronic 
health records, and a plan should be operationalized to provide reminders 
and follow-up for persons who miss visits.
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Chapter 15: Establishing a syringe services program 
What is a syringe services program?
SSPs provide PWID with sterile needles, syringes, and other drug-
preparation equipment; they also collect and safely dispose of used 
syringes. The terms syringe services program, syringe exchange program, 
needle exchange program, and needle and syringe program are often used 
interchangeably. Many use the term syringe access because studies have 
shown that access to new, sterile syringes and collection of used syringes 
from PWID helps prevent the spread of blood-borne pathogens, including 
HIV, HCV, and HBV.
History of SSPs
SSPs began in Amsterdam in 1983 in an effort to decrease HBV 
transmission among PWID. In 1987, the American Foundation for AIDS 
Research established the first legal SSP in the United States in Portland, 
Oregon.52 In 1988, another SSP, supported by the Pierce County Health 
Department and the American Foundation for AIDS Research, opened 
in Tacoma, Washington.52,53 Although it was legal to operate an SSP, the 
1988 passage of section 300-ee-5 of the Public Health and Welfare Act, 
which prohibited the use of federal funds for SSP operations, limited the 
availability of these services. Since the establishment of the first SSPs, 
mounting evidence has shown that SSPs reduce HIV incidence and do not 
contribute to increased injection drug use.54 
In 2016, the Consolidated Appropriations Act (https://www.congress.
gov/114/bills/hr2029/BILLS-114hr2029enr.pdf) modified the restriction on 
use of federal funds for programs distributing sterile needles or syringes. 
Federal funds still cannot be used to purchase sterile needles or syringes 
for injecting illegal drugs or for other devices used only for illegal drug 
injection. However, the 2016 act allows jurisdictions, after consultation 
with CDC and demonstrating need, to use federal funds for the following: 
SSP staff, supplies, syringe disposal services, provision of naloxone and for 
communication, outreach, planning, and evaluation activities.
Assessment 
Before establishing an SSP, it is important to assess the needs of 
potential clients, their families, key stakeholders, law enforcement, and 
the community at large in order to eliminate barriers to implementation 
and to ensure that resources will be used by the persons for whom the 
program was developed. Prompt assessment is particularly important 
when establishing an SSP during an outbreak. The assessment should be 
conducted by persons well versed in SSP best practice to ensure realistic 
expectations of the groups assessed and to answer questions and address 
misconceptions about SSPs. 
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The assessment should include the following: 
■■ Review of applicable local, state, and federal laws and regulations 
■■ Determination of the needs, wants, and nonnegotiable positions of 
the target population, key stakeholders, law enforcement, and the 
community at large 
■■ Determination of measureable goals and objectives of the SSP 
■■ A general method of service delivery, including the following specific 
considerations for operationalizing the SSP:
■■ Structure of funding for staff, supplies, sharps disposal,  
and infrastructure
■■ Role of local and commercial pharmacies in the distribution, 
exchange, or supply of sharps and other supplies
(For examples of assessment questions, see http://www.in.gov/isdh/files/
ISDH%20SEP%20Guidance%20Version%202%200%20FINAL%20-%2010-04-
2016-EC.pdf) 
If the jurisdiction does not have the appropriate staff to complete the 
assessment, technical support can be obtained through the National 
Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors (NASTAD), the Harm 
Reduction Coalition, or other jurisdictions that have operationalized SSPs.
Funding of the SSP
An important component of establishing an SSP is determining how the 
staff, supplies, and infrastructure (e.g., building or mobile unit) will be 
funded. Three federal agencies (CDC, HRSA and the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA]) have issued guidance 
to grantees on how to obtain approval for use of federal grant funds to 
support approved SSP activities. (For the guidance documents, see https://
www.aids.gov/federal-resources/policies/syringe-services-programs/) 
Restrictions on local and state funds should be assessed to determine 
whether they can be used for staff, supplies, and infrastructure and 
whether those funds can be used in conjunction with federal or  
grant funds.
The North American Syringe Exchange Network operates a buyers club 
(offers bulk prices for the purchase of SSP supplies) and offers other 
services, such as technical assistance, to its members. (For information 
about the North American Syringe Exchange Network, see www.nasen.org) 
Development of evaluation tools
Evaluation of the SSP is important to determine the efficacy of a 
newly established or emergently developed program. State and local 
HIV surveillance and epidemiology staff can help determine the most 
appropriate model and method of evaluation. For an SSP established to 
address an outbreak, evaluation tools and outcome reports provide an 
additional progress gauge and thus should be established, if possible. 
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Jurisdictions should use the information collected during the assessment 
phase, legal requirements, and program objectives and goals to determine 
the most appropriate evaluation model for their program. If possible, it is 
important to engage information technology and epidemiology staff in  
the development of evaluation tools to ensure that the tools are easy to 
use, assess, and modify and have the capacity for long-term use with 
minimal revision. 
Operationalizing the SSP
The following questions are pertinent to planning the operation of an SSP 
in response to an outbreak: 
■■ What is the most appropriate location(s) for service delivery? Is a fixed 
site, a mobile site, or a combination best for the target population 
and the surrounding community? Jurisdictions should consider the 
potential barriers to participation associated with choice of location. 
For example, if transportation to a location is not available and 
mobile delivery is not planned, how will potential participants access 
the SSP? 
■■ What hours will the SSP be operational? Will the proposed hours meet 
the needs of the target population? For example, if most members  
of the intended population work full-time schedule (i.e., during the 
day), an SSP that operates only during regular business hours will  
be inaccessible. 
■■ Who will staff the SSP? How many staff will be present at set-up, 
during operational hours, and during clean-up? 
■■ What are the staff qualifications and requirements? For example, will 
staff be required to sign a confidentiality and security agreement, 
understand how to use data collection and basic evaluation tools, 
know the policies and procedures for handling an exchange, know 
emergency procedures for staff and participant safety and security? 
■■ If response personnel will staff the SSP, how will their response and 
SSP roles intersect? 
■■ What is the most appropriate model for the SSP? (For examples 
of models, see http://www.in.gov/isdh/files/ISDH%20SEP%20
Guidance%20Version%202%200%20FINAL%20-%2010-04-2016-EC.pdf)
■■ What services will be offered and how will these services be delivered? 
For example, a process will be needed to deliver the following: 
syringe exchange, delivery of education in safe injection practices, 
wound care, HIV and HCV testing or referrals for HIV and HCV 
testing, and referrals for mental health and substance use treatment.
■■ What supplies will be provided? Determining which supplies are most 
appropriate for the targeted population during the assessment stage 
will ensure that supplies and their cost are limited to the items that 
are most used by the target population. The assessment should also 
determine whether supplies will be assembled into kits or whether 
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supplies will be available in an open-stock format (participants take 
what is most useful for them). In addition to syringes, other safe 
injection supplies should be provided. The following are examples  
of supplies: 
■■ Newsprint or another barrier to create a clean injection space 
■■ Tourniquets 
■■ Alcohol prep pads 
■■ Cookers 
■■ Sterile water vials 
■■ Clean cotton or other filter device 
■■ Basic wound care/first-aid supplies such as antibacterial wipes, 
adhesive bandages, and pain reliever 
■■ A graphic or a written reminder about safe injection practices 
■■ Overdose reversal agent (i.e., naloxone) 
■■ Condoms, dental dams, and lubricants 
■■ Nondescript bags or other containers for transporting supplies 
discreetly
■■ How will sharps be collected and destroyed? A contract that includes 
the collection and destruction of sharps should be established with a 
reputable waste management entity. 
■■ Clients should be provided with individual containers for the 
return of used syringes.
■■ A schedule and a process for the safe disposal of returned 
supplies should be established with the clients. 
Technical assistance for the development of an SSP operational plan can be 
obtained from NASTAD, the North American Syringe Exchange Network, 
and jurisdictions with active SSPs.
Moving from outbreak response to routine service delivery
The development of an SSP to address an acute outbreak should be 
planned with ongoing, routine delivery of syringe services in mind. 
Evaluation tools, staffing plans, and other considerations should be 
established with the idea that the SSP will continue to serve the target 
population after the initial outbreak response. 
(For more information about SSP development and implementation, see 
https://www.nastad.org/sites/default/files/055419_NASTAD-SSP-Guidelines-
August-2012_0.pdf)
Other sources of sterile syringes
In most states, syringes can be purchased without a prescription at a 
pharmacy. The practice depends upon laws that regulate possession and 
sales of drug paraphernalia including syringes. Proof of identification and 
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age may be required to purchase syringes and the quantity of syringes 
that can be purchased at one time may be limited. Pharmacies may also 
be required to maintain a record of buyers. Nonprescription syringe sales 
at pharmacies are often left to the pharmacists’ discretion and individual 
store policy. Before an HIV or HCV outbreak, the health department should 
determine the local practices regarding syringe sales at pharmacies and 
discuss with pharmacists how to coordinate sales and collection of syringes 
with current or new SSPs. The health department can identify the education 
and tools pharmacists may need to provide risk-reduction services and 
referrals for substance use treatment.
(For information about syringe distribution laws, see http://lawatlas.org/
datasets/syringe-policies-laws-regulating-non-retail-distribution-of-drug-
parapherna) 
Comprehensive SSP
A comprehensive, multi-component, prevention program is the most 
effective approach for preventing the transmission and acquisition of 
HIV, HCV and other blood-borne infections among PWID.35 SSPs are 
an important part of a comprehensive prevention program and are key 
to delivering health services to PWID, including HIV and HCV testing, 
hepatitis A and hepatitis B vaccination, risk reduction counseling, overdose 
prevention, and referrals to HIV or HCV primary care and substance use 
disorder treatment.
(For additional resources and tools for developing and implementing SSPs, 
see https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/risk/cdc-hiv-developing-ssp.pdf)
Chapter 15 | Establishing a syringe services program
Before an HIV or 
HCV outbreak, the 
health department 
should determine 
the local practices 
regarding syringe 
sales at pharmacies 
and discuss with 
pharmacists how to 
coordinate sales  
and collection of 
syringes with current 
or new SSPs.
Managing HIV and Hepatitis C Outbreaks Among People Who Inject Drugs—A Guide for State And Local Health Departments
61
Chapter 16:  Treatment of substance use disorders and 
recovery services for PWID
PWID are at high risk for substance use disorders (as defined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). It is important 
for providers to measure the severity of a person’s disorder (measured 
on a continuum from mild to severe), and to identify the substance(s) 
used. This information is needed to develop an individual treatment plan. 
Treatment plans routinely include milestones and goals as measures of 
treatment progress. Optimal treatment plans comprehensively address the 
medical care and treatment needs as well as barriers to successful treatment 
outcomes. For mild substance use disorders, the treatment plan may be 
comprised of psychosocial counseling by a certified counselor and support 
services (e.g., clinical and case management, housing and transportation 
services, and mental health service) while moderate to severe substance 
use disorders likely require inpatient or outpatient medical care and 
treatment with additional social services. For opioid use disorders and 
alcohol use disorders, medication-assisted treatment (MAT) can be used 
as part of the treatment plan. (For information about principles of drug 
addiction treatment, see https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/
files/podat_1.pdf)
Medication-assisted treatment 
MAT is treatment for addiction that includes the use of medication along 
with counseling and other support. MAT is the most effective treatment for 
opioid use disorder and is associated with retention in treatment, reduction 
in illicit opiate use, decreased craving, and improved social functioning.55 
MAT is not the same as substituting one addictive drug for another. For 
persons with opioid use disorder, three medications have FDA approval for 
MAT: methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone.56 
Methadone 
Methadone is a long-acting, opioid agonist (a drug that mimics the effects 
of naturally occurring endorphins by binding to opioid receptors) that 
prevents withdrawal symptoms for 24 hours or longer, reduces cravings 
for opioids, and reduces the euphoric effects of subsequent illicit opioid 
use. Methadone use for opioid use disorder is regulated and can only 
be dispensed in licensed and accredited opioid treatment programs. 
Methadone is dispensed in a controlled setting in which ingestion is 
directly observed.57 Although methadone is usually administered as a single 
daily dose, dosages can vary widely. Side effects of chronic methadone 
therapy include constipation, mild drowsiness, excess sweating, reduced 
libido, increased sensitivity to pain, erectile dysfunction, and peripheral 
edema. Methadone, compared with buprenorphine, has a greater potential 
for lethal overdose (see below). 
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Methadone treatment
Methadone treatment for opioid use disorder requires enrollment in an 
opioid treatment program. Opioid treatment programs can either be 
private clinics (which require fee-for-service and may or may not accept 
health insurance), non-profit treatment programs or federal treatment 
programs administered through the Veterans Administration. Insured 
clients receive services that are reimbursed through private insurance or 
public healthcare coverage. 
Opioid treatment programs require that a person have a diagnosis of 
opioid use disorder to enroll into a methadone treatment program; this 
diagnosis is obtained during the full physical examination that occurs as 
part of enrollment. A methadone maintenance program may enroll clients 
via appointment or through walk-in hours held very early in the morning. 
Because methadone requires daily adherence, methadone clinics often 
dispense medication for a few hours in the mornings. Opioid treatment 
programs can vary in the types of services and treatment modalities 
provided; clients should, therefore, chose a treatment program that 
provides services that match their needs. 
Methadone maintenance is the first-line treatment for pregnant women with 
an opioid use disorder.58 Maintenance treatment with methadone can have 
beneficial effects in addition to treatment of opioid use disorder: it has 
been associated with reductions in mortality rates and with reductions in 
the HIV transmission.59,60
To locate methadone maintenance programs by state, see National Opioid 
Treatment Program Directory, maintained by the Substance use and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA): http://dpt2.samhsa.gov/
treatment/directory.aspx. 
Buprenorphine
Buprenorphine, a partial opioid agonist, reduces illicit opioid use 
when used in the long-term treatment of persons with opioid use 
disorder.56,61 Buprenorphine is available as a tablet for sublingual use 
(under the tongue) or as a sublingual film. Buprenorphine is initially 
given as monotherapy but later the regimen is changed to a combination 
preparation with naloxone (an opioid antagonist), unless the patient is 
pregnant. The combination preparation acts as a disincentive to crushing 
the tablets and dissolving them for intravenous injection or dissolving 
the film for injection, because use of the manipulated product can cause 
opioid withdrawal.56 Before buprenorphine or buprenorphine-naloxone 
is initiated, the patient should have abstained from other opioids for long 
enough to be in a state of mild-to-moderate opioid withdrawal. Both 
buprenorphine and buprenorphine-naloxone are administered as a single 
sublingual dose of 4–24 mg per day. When the patient has been stabilized 
at a particular dose, the patient may receive a prescription for up to a 
1-month supply, refillable for up to 6 months (similar to the prescription 
of other Schedule III controlled substances). 
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Side effects of buprenorphine can include sedation, headache, nausea, 
constipation, depression, diarrhea, runny eyes and nose, lack of energy, 
and insomnia. Buprenorphine-related deaths during maintenance therapy 
have occurred, primarily when buprenorphine is taken in combination with 
other substances, especially benzodiazepines and alcohol.62
Buprenorphine treatment
In 2016, the FDA approved a long-acting subdermal buprenorphine implant 
for the treatment of opioid use disorders.56 Buprenorphine implants 
provide a low, steady dose of the medication for 6 months. The implant is 
intended for use only in persons who have reached clinical stability with 
sublingual or buccal buprenorphine at a daily dose of ≤8 mg. 
Buprenorphine, unlike methadone, can be prescribed in primary care 
settings.63 Induction (the process to find the person’s ideal daily dose) 
may be accomplished in the clinician’s office under observation or at 
the person’s home. Before prescribing, providers may require patient 
counseling and to determine the appropriate dose, may require multiple 
visits for urinary analysis.64 Most buprenorphine providers require 
insurance reimbursement. Some ADAP programs cover buprenorphine and 
other substance use disorder treatment medications. 
(For information about ADAP coverage, see https://www.nastad.org/sites/
default/files/ADAP-Formulary-Database-Users-Guide-FINAL.pdf)
To prescribe or dispense buprenorphine, providers must receive a waiver 
(i.e., complete required training and apply for the waiver). A waiver limits 
the number of persons a provider can treat with buprenorphine. 
Not all providers who have a buprenorphine waiver see patients. If no 
providers in your area have a buprenorphine waiver, contact local primary 
care providers, provide waiver information, and ask them to request a 
waiver so that they can provide buprenorphine. Providing buprenorphine 
and medical care for HCV and HIV at one location can reduce barriers to 
opioid maintenance therapy, increase retention in care, and improve HCV 
and HIV outcomes.65–67 When colocation is not possible, linkages between 
the primary health care sites to buprenorphine services can be established. 
SAMHSA maintains a list of registered buprenorphine providers online 
(https://findtreatment.samhsa.gov/). Individual providers should be 
contacted to determine if treatment slots are available.
Naltrexone
Naltrexone, compared with opioid agonists such as methadone or 
buprenorphine, helps overcome addiction in a different way. Naltrexone 
is a non-narcotic opioid antagonist that can be used as part of a relapse 
prevention program. It is frequently used in  criminal justice and state-
supported treatment programs that may be opposed to treatment using 
narcotic medications. Naltrexone can prevent relapse because it blocks 
opioid receptors and the effect of opioid drugs (i.e., takes away the feeling 
of “getting high”). 
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Oral naltrexone is taken as a single 50 mg tablet once daily. The medication 
can be started 3–6 days after the most recent use of short-acting opioids 
and 7–10 days after the most recent use of methadone or buprenorphine. 
A long-acting injectable form of naltrexone can be given every 4 weeks 
by deep intramuscular injection in the gluteal muscle at a set dose of 380 
mg per injection. Side effects include hypertension, nausea, vomiting, 
abdominal pain, headache, insomnia, dizziness, anxiety, and decreased 
energy among others. The extended release form of naltrexone is favored 
over the daily pill, for convenience and adherence reasons. Naltrexone has 
not been found to be addictive or to have high potential for abuse. 
Choosing between MAT options
There are few studies that compare the relative benefits of one MAT 
medication over another.58 Selection of an MAT medication should therefore 
be made following a discussion, between provider and patient, of the risks 
and benefits of each medication. However, the suggested first-line treatment 
for opioid use disorder is an opioid agonist (methadone or buprenorphine) 
rather than an opioid-antagonist (naltrexone). Naltrexone may be a 
reasonable first-line alternative to opioid agonists for a highly motivated 
patient with mild opioid use disorder or for persons in occupations that 
do not permit treatment with an opioid agonist.56 Buprenorphine is often 
preferred to methadone because buprenorphine can be prescribed and 
administered in primary care settings and has less potential for lethal 
overdose. Buprenorphine is also the preferred MAT option for teens over 
16 years of age. Providers can consult with an addiction specialist to help 
choose a MAT option.
(For more information about MAT, see https://www.samhsa.gov/
medication-assisted-treatment) 
Other considerations
Before treating adolescents, federal, state, or insurance provider regulations 
should be verified to determine if MAT requires parental consent or 
notification prior to treatment. Persons who discontinue MAT and resume 
opioid use should be informed of the potential for an opioid overdose 
because of the loss of tolerance to opioids or misjudgment of a safe opioid 
dose to use at the time of relapse.
Detoxification
Detoxification is not treatment; detoxification is a set of interventions aimed 
at the management of acute intoxication and withdrawal.68 Detoxification is 
also a form of palliative care (reducing the intensity of a disorder) for those 
who want to become abstinent or who must observe mandatory abstinence 
as a result of hospitalization or legal requirement.68 Medically supervised 
detoxification may prevent potentially life-threatening complications in 
an untreated patient. However, detoxification without MAT may increase 
the risk of overdose among patients who have lost their tolerance to 
opioids and then resume use.69 Detoxification is not required prior to 
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methadone or buprenorphine treatment, but is required for initiation of 
naltrexone for MAT.68 Detoxification is not indicated for persons who have 
not used sufficient amounts of opioids to develop withdrawal symptoms 
or for persons whose time since last use is distant enough that they are 
no longer at risk of withdrawal. Methadone is the most frequently used 
agent approved for opioid detoxification, though buprenorphine is also 
approved for use. Although not FDA-approved for detoxification, clonidine 
(an α-adrenergic agent) is sometimes used during detoxification because 
it relieves most opioid withdrawal symptoms without producing opioid 
intoxication or drug reward.68
(For more information about detoxification, see http://store.samhsa.gov/
shin/content/SMA15-4131/SMA15-4131.pdf) 
Naloxone 
Naloxone is a fast-acting opioid antagonist that is used to reverse the 
effects of opioids and can be used as part of rescue from opioid overdose. 
Naloxone can be prescribed to persons who are considered at risk of 
opioid overdose, including those receiving MAT. Naloxone is approved 
by FDA to prevent overdose from opioids such as heroin, morphine, and 
oxycodone. Naloxone is an opioid receptor antagonist; it blocks opioid 
receptor sites, reversing the toxic effects of an overdose. Naloxone is 
administered when a patient shows signs of opioid overdose (e.g., loss 
of consciousness; unresponsiveness to stimulus; slow, shallow, erratic, 
or ceased breathing; vomiting; slow, erratic or no pulse; limp body). 
The medication can be given by intranasal spray or by intramuscular, 
subcutaneous, or intravenous injection. Candidates for naloxone include 
those who take high doses (>50 morphine milligram equivalents per day) 
of opioids for chronic pain, receive both opioids and benzodiazepines, use 
illicit opioids, receive rotating opioid medication regimens, or take certain 
extended-release or long-acting opioid medications. Side effects may 
include hypertension, tachycardia, agitation, convulsions, diarrhea,  
and nausea. 
Outpatient and inpatient substance use treatment
Drug treatment programs can generally be classified into two types: 
outpatient programs and inpatient programs. Outpatient programs provide 
care or services at the program facility or clinic and allow the client to 
return to their home or other living arrangement after provision of services. 
Medical outpatient programs can provide individualized treatment plans 
for those with mild to severe substance use disorders. Inpatient programs 
require the client to live at the treatment facility and can provide services 
throughout the day. Medical inpatient programs provide care and treatment 
for individuals with severe substance use disorders as well as those with 
comorbid mental illness. 
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Outpatient treatment
Outpatient services can include one-on-one counseling, group counseling, 
family therapy, educational groups, and psychotherapy.70 Many MAT-
prescribing doctors require that patients be engaged in outpatient 
treatment while taking MAT. Currently, mental health and substance use 
counseling and other outpatient service are covered by private insurance 
and public healthcare coverage. Some outpatient services are also covered 
by Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program Part B funds. Persons seeking recovery 
may need assistance in identifying the type of coverage available to them. 
SAMHSA’s Behavioral Health Treatment Services Locator (https://
findtreatment.samhsa.gov/) can be used to identify substance use and 
mental health treatment services. The tool combines outpatient and 
inpatient providers. Outpatient services vary in nature and focus (for more 
information, follow the website links). The tool can also be used to help 
providers present all available service options and discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of each option so that provider and patient can make an 
informed decision together. 
Inpatient treatment
Inpatient treatment provides a contained, supportive environment for 
persons seeking recovery. Room and board, counseling, and extra-
curricular activities are provided for a specific period (specified in the 
patient’s insurance plan). Not all public healthcare coverage covers in-
patient treatment. The coverage offered by private insurance plans differs 
by provider and plan (e.g., one plan might cover a 1 month inpatient stay; 
another might cover only a few days). Many of the considerations that 
apply to outpatient treatment also apply to inpatient treatment. SAMHSA’s 
Behavioral Health Treatment Services Locator can be used to identify in-
patient programs in any given area. The Locator includes outpatient and 
inpatient providers. Follow the website links to find out more information. 
Residential inpatient programs can be short or long term. Long-term 
residential treatment facilities provide care 24 hours a day, generally in non-
hospital settings. A common residential treatment model is the therapeutic 
community. Therapeutic communities focus on the “resocialization” of 
the individual and use the program’s entire community—including other 
residents, staff, and the social context—as active components of treatment. 
Other long-term residential programs include safe housing programs such 
as Oxford House (http://www.oxfordhouse.org/userfiles/file/purpose_and_
structure.php) which provides democratically run, self-supporting, and low 
cost housing to persons in recovery.
(For more information about therapeutic communities, see https://www.
drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/therapeutic-communities/
what-are-therapeutic-communities)
Short-term residential programs provide intensive but relatively brief 
treatment based on a modified version of the 12-step approach of 
Alcoholics Anonymous®. The original residential treatment model consisted 
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of a 3 to 6 week hospital-based inpatient treatment phase followed by 
extended outpatient therapy and participation in a self-help group, such as 
Narcotic Anonymous®. Following stays in residential treatment programs, 
it is important for individuals to remain engaged in outpatient treatment 
programs or aftercare programs to reduce the risk of relapse.
Some inpatient and outpatient substance-use treatment facilities offer linkage 
to infectious disease prevention and care services. Treatment facility staff can 
be engaged, by health department staff, to further consider a client’s need 
for infectious disease prevention and care, including testing and treatment 
adherence. Partnerships can be formed between health departments, CBOs, 
substance-use treatment facilities, and MAT clinics to provide infectious 
disease testing, linkage-to-care, health education classes, and naloxone 
distribution to all program clients who desire these services.
Recovery 
SAMHSA defines recovery as a process of change through which individuals 
improve their health and wellness, live self-directed lives and strive to reach 
their full potential. SAMHSA lists four signs that lets persons know they are 
in recovery: person can address problems as they happen, without using 
illicit drugs, and without getting stressed; person has at least one person 
with whom they can be completely honest; person has personal boundaries 
and knows which issues are theirs and which ones belong to other people; 
person takes the time to restore their energy—physical and emotional—
when tired. There are community and facility based services available for 
people in recovery.
Recovery-Oriented Systems of Care
Recovery-Oriented Systems of Care are coordinated networks of 
community-based services and support that builds on the strengths of 
individuals, families, and communities to achieve abstinence (http://www.
williamwhitepapers.com/pr/CSAT%20ROSC%20Definition.pdf).
(For examples of Recovery-Oriented Systems of Care, see  
http://www.michigan.gov/
mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-71550_2941_4871_4877_48561-113480--,00.html 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdch/ROSC_FS-_SUD_Agency_
Directors_337044_7.pdf https://www.dshs.texas.gov/substance-abuse/ROSC/)
Spiritual programs
The most widely available form of recovery support is that offered by 
community-based peer-run 12 step programs such as Narcotics Anonymous® 
and Cocaine Anonymous®; both programs use the 12 steps of Alcoholics 
Anonymous®. Narcotics Anonymous® and Cocaine Anonymous® are non-
drug specific programs. In-person, online, and phone meeting locators 
are available online for Narcotics Anonymous® (https://www.na.org/
meetingsearch/index.php), Cocaine Anonymous® (http://www.ca-online.org/
meetings/), and Alcoholics Anonymous® (http://www.aa.org/pages/en_US/
find-aa-resources). 
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Secular Programs
Community-based secular alternatives to 12-step programs focus on 
sharing, cultivating life skills, and building peer recovery networks. 
Abstinence-based programs include organizations such as LifeRing® (http://
lifering.org/), which offers meetings, and Oxford House™ (http://www.
oxfordhouse.org/userfiles/file/house-directory.php), which offers sober 
recovery homes. Nonabstinence-based programs are a good fit for persons 
on MAT and others who define recovery as moderate use, not abstinence. 
Nonabstinence based programs include organizations such as SMART 
Recovery® (http://www.smartrecovery.org/) and Moderation Management 
(http://www.moderation.org/meetings/). 
Recovery programs can also be facility-based. (For an example of a facility-
based recovery program, see http://marsproject.org/)
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Notes from the field
Historically, naloxone has been used only by trained medical personnel such as physicians 
and paramedics. Barriers to more widespread access include concerns about liability and 
regulatory issues. In the past few years, many states have launched initiatives to make 
naloxone directly available to patients. In 2016, the Wisconsin governor’s office worked 
closely with the Wisconsin Department of Health Services to establish a statewide standing 
order for naloxone. 
At the direction of the governor, a physician at Wisconsin Department of Health Services 
signed an order that allowed all pharmacies in Wisconsin to dispense naloxone, without 
an individual prescription, to anyone at risk or to anyone who would benefit from having 
naloxone on hand to respond to an overdose. The order was intended for pharmacies that 
do not have a medical provider on staff to write a prescription. The standing order further 
authorized pharmacists in Wisconsin to maintain supplies of naloxone and dispense them, 
along with instructions for use. 
In addition to collaborating with state government to establish the statewide standing order, 
the Wisconsin Department of Health Services was involved in the following activities: 
■■ Providing a list of required trainings for pharmacists to be eligible to use the statewide 
standing order
■■ Creating tools for pharmacists: 
■■ Posters to communicate the availability of naloxone at pharmacies 
■■ Screening checklist to identify persons who may benefit from naloxone (e.g., 
persons who have a prescription for a high dosage of an opioid or first-time users 
[persons who have never previously been prescribed opioids]) 
■■ List of items that should be included in each naloxone kit
■■ Creating patient education materials:
■■ How to administer naloxone and how to respond to an overdose 
■■ Patient resource guides for safe disposal options
■■ List of resources for substance-use treatment
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Chapter 17: Setting up a one-stop shop
During an HIV or HCV outbreak, affected persons may require rapid 
provision of multiple care-related services. A key consideration during 
an outbreak is how to reduce the number of steps, visits, locations, and 
overall effort required to get care. If possible, planners should prepare to 
provide multiple services at a central location, or a one-stop shop (Figure 
17-1). The one-stop shop model of HIV and HCV management addresses 
barriers to HIV and HCV testing, treatment, and addiction recovery for 
PWID and may be especially useful in rural settings. Addressing injection 
drug use and its complications holistically is often better than addressing 
disease treatment alone. 
The following are important considerations in establishing a one-stop shop:
■■ Location: 
■■ Should be determined after discussions with local leaders and 
stakeholders.
■■ Should be accessible and available to the target population and 
large enough to provide the intended services. Consider location 
walkability for areas where lack of transportation is a barrier. 
■■ Should be private enough that potential clients will not feel 
exposed when seeking services there. 
■■ Determine the services the one-stop shop will provide. Potential 
services include the following:
■■ Health insurance registration/enrollment.
■■ Procurement of identification documents (e.g., driver’s license, 
identification card, birth certificate), and any other records that 
may be a prerequisite to health insurance enrollment.
■■ HIV and HCV testing.
■■ Care coordination and referral for HIV and HCV prevention and 
treatment services.
■■ Screening and referral for mental health and substance-use 
treatment.
■■ Syringe services. 
■■ Opioid overdose prevention and treatment education and 
services (e.g., naloxone training and distribution). 
■■ Immunizations indicated for PWID (e.g., tetanus, hepatitis A, 
hepatitis B) as well as other routine immunizations  
(e.g., influenza).
■■ Determine how services will be promoted in the community.
■■ Set up processes for maintaining client confidentiality. 
■■ Acknowledge clients’ need for flexible schedules and services. For 
example, to accommodate injection practices, some clients may need 
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to visit the one-stop shop several times in order to take advantage of 
all the services they need.
■■ Maintain an active database of services provided. 
■■ Strongly consider addressing the needs of family members during 
wait times. For example, toys for children, diaper-changing stations 
with supplies, snacks, and sufficient staff to talk with family members 
will enhance clients’ experience and help to build rapport with staff. 
■■ Determine whether the one-stop shop should continue after the 
outbreak has ended.
Figure 17‑1 Example of a One‑stop shop
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Notes from the field
In response to the unprecedented HIV outbreak in Scott County, Indiana, in 2015, the Indiana 
State Department of Health (ISDH) in collaboration with the Scott County Health Department 
established a one-stop shop. 
The initial objective of the one-stop shop was to help clients apply for and receive approval 
for the Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 insurance coverage, which would enable them to receive 
medical care and treatment. In addition, HIV and HCV testing, immunizations, and mental 
health and addiction counseling services would be offered. Many other services were added 
along the way.
The governor declared the outbreak a public health emergency, which enabled the Scott 
County Health Department to seek and gain approval to implement the first SSP in the State 
of Indiana. The Scott County Health Department opened an SSP 3 days after the one-stop 
shop opened. The SSP, albeit with a separate entrance, was located in the same building as 
the one-stop shop. 
The first 60 days of the one-stop shop were managed through an incident command system. 
ISDH staff were on-site at the one-stop shop for 90 days to ensure sustainability. A recovery 
plan was initiated before demobilization of ISDH staff and transition of management of the 
one-stop shop to the Scott County Health Department.
To publicize the services, location, and operating hours of the one-stop shop, volunteers from 
the state Medical Reserve Corps distributed flyers door to door and set up mobile stations in 
affected neighborhoods. Signs were placed throughout the community—along roadways 
and in neighborhoods—and flyers were mailed to each home in Scott County.
Communications about the outbreak response and the one-stop shop—to the targeted 
population and the media—had to be considered and addressed throughout the response. 
To protect the privacy of visitors to the one-stop shop, the incident commander and ISDH 
decided not to allow media inside the shop during operating hours; press were invited to 
the shop at designated dates and times when the one-stop shop had closed for the day. In 
addition, the ISDH, Scott County Health Department, Scott County Sheriff, and Austin Police 
Department held weekly press briefings for the first 60 days of the response.
Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as community groups, faith-based volunteers, and 
private-sector partners, were involved in the one-stop shop. Their involvement allowed the 
continuation of the one-stop shop after the initial outbreak response concluded. Services 
continue to be provided once a week in the Scott County one-stop shop and the SSP (housed 
in the shop) offers services via a mobile unit multiple times throughout the week.
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The following are the services that the one-stop shop provided and the agencies or 
organizations involved in providing the service:
■■ HIV and HCV testing (ISDH)
■■ Care coordination (ISDH and Scott/Clark County Health Department)
■■ DIS (made available through ISDH, CDC and EMAC) 
■■ Immunizations (ISDH Immunization division)
■■ Insurance and presumptive eligibility (Family and Social Services Administration /
Medicaid, Covering Kids and Families Indiana)
■■ Vital Records—birth certificates (ISDH)
■■ Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles—identification cards
■■ Job training (Indiana Department of Workforce Development)
■■ Food and shelter (Faith-based organizations, Housing and Urban Development)
■■ Transportation (ISDH, Scott County Health Department, local churches)
■■ SSP (Scott County Health Department)
■■ Mental health and substance use disorder services (Indiana Division of Mental 
Health and Addiction, LifeSprings Community Mental Health Center) 
■■ Medical care, including STI and pregnancy screening (Foundations Family Medicine, 
AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Indiana University School of Medicine)
■■ Health messaging and education (ISDH Office of Public Affairs, CDC, Region V 
Midwest AIDS Training and Education Center)
Several factors became important in the implementation and rapid evaluation of the 
one-stop shop. 
■■ Offering services (HIV testing, syringe exchange, and coordination) at a fixed and 
mobile location increased acceptance of services and enhanced the possibility of 
long-term connectivity to services. 
■■ A concrete, well-coordinated media plan to protect the confidentiality of  
clients entering and exiting the one-stop shop helped build community trust  
and acceptance.
■■ The capacity to enter data through tablet, laptops, or phone service allowed 
ongoing analysis of process and outcome metrics. 
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Chapter 18: HIV pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis
PWID who test negative for HIV benefit from referrals to syringe services, 
substance-use treatment facilities, mental health services, and social 
services and may also benefit from biomedical HIV prevention.
Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP)
What is PrEP, and why use it?
PrEP is the use of HIV medications to lower the risk of getting HIV. Among 
PWID, daily use of PrEP reduces the risk of HIV by more than 70%.71 At 
present, PrEP consists of a single pill (fixed-dose combination tablet of 
tenofovir disoproxil fumarate and emtricitabine) taken once daily. PrEP 
should be administered according to the current PrEP practice guidelines 
(https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/23109).
Who should be prescribed PrEP?
PrEP is indicated for PWID aged at least 18 years, without a diagnosis of 
acute or established HIV infection, who in the past 6 months have injected 
drugs not prescribed by a clinician and for whom at least one of the 
following is true: (1) shared any injection or drug preparation equipment; 
(2) received MAT (e.g., methadone or buprenorphine); or (3) is at risk 
of sexual acquisition of HIV). PrEP may benefit persons who, despite 
efforts to get them into drug treatment, continue to inject drugs. PrEP may 
also benefit persons using an SSP because users of these services may 
occasionally share needles or other injection equipment.
Laboratory testing requirements
To avoid prescribing PrEP for an HIV-infected person, clinicians should 
confirm that the person is HIV-negative and should repeat HIV testing 
every 3 months (i.e., before refilling a prescription for PrEP). Confirmation 
of HIV negativity includes assessment of renal function (creatinine 
clearance of ≥60 ml/min) and testing for HBV: decreased renal function and 
active HBV infection pose risk for the use of tenofovir disoproxil fumarate 
and emtricitabine.
PrEP resources
■■ A brief guide about covering the cost of PrEP care is available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/risk/prep/cdc-hiv-paying-for-prep.pdf.
■■ Infographics, videos, fact sheets, reports, and other educational 
materials about PrEP, including resources for health care providers, 
are available at https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/prep/index.html.
■■ Clinical support services for providers who need consultation before 
initiating PrEP are available from the National Clinician Consultation 
Center (http://nccc.ucsf.edu/clinician-consultation/prep-pre-exposure-
prophylaxis/) or through PrEPline: 855-448-7737, or 855-HIV-PrEP.
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Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP)
What is PEP, and why use it?
PEP is the use of antiretroviral medicines after a potential exposure to HIV 
to prevent HIV infection. There are 2 types of PEP: nPEP (nonoccupational 
post-exposure prophylaxis) and oPEP (occupational post-exposure 
prophylaxis). A person takes nPEP when the potential exposure occurred 
outside of the work environment, such as after sex or injection drug use. 
oPEP is taken because of a potential on-the-job exposure to HIV such as 
after a needlestick injury. 
The PEP regimen, which must be started ≤72 hours after possible exposure, 
consists of a 28-day course of a 3-drug antiretroviral regimen, taken once or 
twice daily. PEP should be administered according to the current practice 
guidelines (https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/38856 and https://stacks.cdc.
gov/view/cdc/20711).
Who should be prescribed PEP?
Clinicians should consider the following factors when determining whether 
to prescribe PEP.
1. Whether the source of exposure is known to have HIV infection
2. The potentially infected body fluid(s) to which the person  
was exposed
3. Exposure site or surface
Persons who engage in behaviors that result in frequent, recurrent 
exposures that would require sequential or near-continuous courses of PEP 
should be offered PrEP at the conclusion of their 28-day PEP medication 
course. Upon documentation of the person’s HIV-negative status, PrEP can 
begin immediately.
Clinicians should make case-by-case determinations about prescribing  
PEP when the patient was exposed to infection from a person of unknown 
HIV status. 
Laboratory testing requirements
Before PEP is initiated, persons should be tested by using an Ag/Ab test 
(or an antibody-based blood test). If rapid HIV blood test results are 
unavailable but PEP is otherwise indicated, PEP should be initiated without 
delay (can be modified if the patient is determined to be HIV-infected or 
discontinued if the source is determined not to be HIV-infected). Additional 
laboratory testing is recommended in the PEP guidelines to identify 
conditions that may affect the PEP regimen and to monitor for safety or 
toxicities. (For recommended additional laboratory testing, see https://
stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/38856 and https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/20711)
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PEP resources
Clinical support services for providers needing consultation prior to 
initiating PEP is available from the National Clinician Consultation 
Center (http://nccc.ucsf.edu/clinician-consultation/pep-post-exposure-
prophylaxis/) or the PEPline: (888)-448-4911.
Notes from the field
In Indiana, persons who test HIV-negative but who are considered at high risk of HIV infection 
are connected to providers for HIV PrEP education. These persons receive state services 
through the Special Populations Support Program, which is administered by the Division of 
HIV/STD, ISDH. The program is designed to deliver 2 distinct, but complementary, services: 
disease prevention and supportive care. The Special Populations Support Program employs 
certified HIV testing counselors who have been trained to perform comprehensive risk 
assessments, pretest counseling, testing, posttest counseling, and general outreach for 
PWID. Testing counselors conduct their activities in a variety of venues—wherever the target 
population can be found—including state treatment facilities sanctioned by the Department 
of Mental Health and Addictions. Any person who tests positive for HIV is referred to the 
program’s support specialists who offer the person interventions designed to minimize 
substance use and maximize compliance with treatment plans. The specialists work closely 
with local HIV care coordinators to ensure that the person receives a full complement of care.
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Chapter 19:  Other considerations—hepatitis B virus 
infection
The prevalence of HBV infection among PWID is an estimated 12%.72 
In recent years some states, that have experienced an increase in 
reported cases of acute hepatitis C associated with injection drug use, 
have witnessed an increase in reported cases of acute hepatitis B.73 The 
prevention and control of HBV infection hinges on screening and linkage-
to-care or vaccination. Current CDC guidelines recommend HBV screening 
for high-risk populations, including PWID, persons infected with HIV, 
and certain other groups.74 Screening should include hepatitis B surface 
antigen, antibodies to hepatitis B surface antigen, and antibodies to 
hepatitis B core antigen. 
(For a summary of the interpretation of HBV serology, see https://www.
cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5708a1.htm)
Persons who test positive for hepatitis B surface antigen may have acute  
or chronic HBV infection. These persons should receive counseling on  
how to reduce transmission and should receive hepatitis B−directed care 
and treatment. Persons linked to care can experience a reduction in  
HBV-associated morbidity and mortality and reduce the transmission of 
HBV infections. 
The 3-dose hepatitis B vaccination series is highly effective in preventing 
HBV infection and is recommended for adults, including PWID, at risk of 
HBV infection.75 The first dose can be administered at the time that HBV 
testing is performed. 
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Appendix A
Glossary
Acute HIV infection: The period immediately after infection (approximately first 6 weeks after 
infection) when the virus is detectable by a NAT or antigen test but antibody response is immature or 
undetectable. Acute infection is the period of peak viremia and greatest risk of infecting others. 
Antibody avidity-based serologic assays: Antibodies produced following recent infection have low 
avidity or binding strength while, months following infection, antibodies mature to high avidity or 
high binding strength. Therefore, avidity assays can be used to assess low avidity (which indicates 
recent infection) versus high avidity (past infection).
Case surveillance: Monitoring new diagnoses of HIV and HCV infection by specific geographic areas, 
populations, and time periods.
Cluster: An aggregation of cases grouped in place and time that are suspected to be greater than the 
number expected, even though the expected number may not be known.
Community-based organization: A public or private nonprofit organization of demonstrated 
effectiveness that is representative of a community, or a significant segment of a community, and 
provides education or related services to persons in the community.
Contact investigation: The identification and follow-up of persons who may have come into contact 
with a person who is infected with HIV or HCV.
Direct acting antiviral therapy: Therapy with antiviral medications that target specific steps within the 
HCV life cycle resulting in disruption of viral replication and infection.
Disease intervention specialist: A public health outreach worker who is responsible for locating, 
counseling, and educating persons with sexually transmitted and other communicable diseases, and 
their contacts.
Early HIV infection: The time up to 6 months after infection during which anti-HIV antibodies  
are detectable.
Emergency operations center: The centralized base of operations during an emergency.
Genetic distance threshold: The level of genetic similarity between HIV nucleotide sequences, which 
is used to identify closely related pairs.
Incident command system: A command and control system delineating job responsibilities, 
organizational structure, and coordination of emergency response. ICS provides a common hierarchy 
within which responders from multiple agencies can operate during all types of emergency incidents. 
Incident commander: The person responsible for the overall management of an emergency response.
Informed consent: Permission granted, for testing or treatment, with the full knowledge of the risks, 
benefits, and possible consequences.
Molecular cluster: A group of persons with diagnosed HIV infection who have genetically similar  
HIV strains.
Molecular surveillance: A laboratory-based method that can determine the genetic sequence of an HIV 
strain in a person. If the HIV strains from two or more persons are very similar then those persons 
may be in the same transmission network.
National Incident Management System: An integrated framework that defines the roles and 
responsibilities of federal, state, and local first responders during emergency events. Developed for 
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responders from different jurisdictions and disciplines to more effectively work together to respond 
to emergencies.
National Response Framework: A guide to how the nation responds to all types of disasters and 
emergencies. It is built on the template identified in the National Incident Management System and 
aligns key roles and responsibilities across the nation. 
Nucleic acid test: A molecular technique used to detect a particular pathogen in blood, tissue or other 
body fluid. The test is based on detection and amplification of targeted regions of pathogen RNA or 
DNA. The term NAT includes any test that directly detects the genetic material of a pathogen such as 
polymerase chain reaction.
Nucleotide sequence: The order of nucleotides, the basic structural units of DNA and RNA, within a 
DNA or RNA molecule.
Outbreak: More diagnoses than expected within a geographic area or population during a particular 
time period and evidence of recent transmission among these case patients. The definition of an 
outbreak is not standardized but is relative to the local context.
Partner services: A broad group of services that are offered to persons with HIV and other STIs and 
their partners. Services include partner notification where past and present sexual and/or needle 
sharing partners are notified of a possible exposure. Services may also include prevention counseling, 
STI testing, hepatitis screening and vaccination, treatment or linkage to medical care, linkage or 
referral to other prevention services, and linkage or referral to other services (e.g., substance-use 
treatment and mental health services). 
Point-of-care testing: Testing technology that allows persons to be tested for HIV or HCV and know 
their status during the same visit, usually in less than an hour. Also, referred to as “rapid” testing.
Post-exposure prophylaxis: The use of antiretroviral medicines after a potential exposure to HIV to 
prevent HIV infection. 
Pre-exposure prophylaxis: A method for persons who do not have HIV but who are at substantial risk 
of getting HIV to prevent HIV infection by taking a pill every day. The pill contains two medicines 
that are used to treat HIV. When someone is exposed to HIV through sex or injection drug use, these 
medicines can work to keep the virus from establishing a permanent infection. 
Rapid testing: Testing technology that allows persons to be tested for HIV or HCV and know their 
status during the same visit, usually in less than an hour. Analogous to “point-of-care” testing.
Recent HIV infection: The period of HIV infection that is defined by a laboratory-based recency assay 
and usually occurs within 6 months of infection. 
Risk network: A group of persons among which HIV transmission has occurred and could be ongoing.
Sustained virologic response (HCV): An undetectable HCV RNA level 12 weeks after completion of 
therapy for hepatitis C.
Transmission cluster: A group of HIV-infected persons (diagnosed and undiagnosed) who have a 
direct or indirect epidemiological connection related to HIV transmission.
Appendix A | Glossary
Managing HIV and Hepatitis C Outbreaks Among People Who Inject Drugs—A Guide for State And Local Health Departments
84
Appendix B
Procedure for the collection, processing, and shipment of serum  
and plasma specimens to CDC for sequence analyses and detection  
of HIV infections
A. Timing of specimen shipments to CDC
1. CDC can assist with laboratory testing of blood specimens during an outbreak investigation. 
Coordination and communication of specimen shipment with CDC is required to facilitate 
proper timeliness of the testing and results reporting, and depends on the preliminary 
assessment of the investigation. For example, if the potential outbreak appears limited in scope, 
all specimens can be collected and then shipped to CDC in a single shipment. In potential 
larger outbreak investigations, specimens can be collected and shipped weekly or bi-weekly to 
CDC. Other arrangements can be made with CDC as needed for the specific investigation.
B. General specimen and paperwork requirements
1. All specimens and paperwork should be coded without any personal identifiers.
2. Prepare an excel file listing the specimens with local IDs, specimen volumes, collection dates, 
and any local HIV and HCV test results. Email completed specimen excel file to Bill Switzer 
(HIV Laboratory, Diagnostics and Incidence Team Lead) at bis3@cdc.gov when the specimens 
are shipped to CDC.
3. HIV sequence analysis and recency testing requires a minimum of 1.0 mL serum or plasma.
C. Serum specimens
1. Collect 10–20 mL of whole blood using standard clinical venipuncture techniques. 
2. Mix by gently inverting the tubes no more than eight times and allow the blood to clot by 
standing tubes vertically at room temperature for at least 30 minutes but not longer than 1 hour 
before centrifugation.
3. Place tubes in wet ice for no longer than 2 hours before centrifuging. 
4. Centrifuge blood at least 15 minutes at 2200–2500 RPM at 4°C within one hour of collection.
5. Transfer 1.0 mL aliquots to pre-labeled screwcap cryovials on wet ice. Do not transfer red cells 
to the vial. Cap needs to be firmly screwed tight to prevent leakage.
6. Freeze aliquots at –20 to –80°C until shipped.
D. Plasma specimens
1. Collect 10–20 mL of ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA) or acid citrate dextrose treated 
whole blood using standard clinical venipuncture techniques. Completely fill the labeled blood 
collection tube whenever possible to eliminate dilution from the anticoagulant or preservative.
2. Immediately mix the blood by gently and thoroughly inverting the tube five to ten times.
3. Centrifuge for at least 15 minutes at 2200–2500 RPM within one hour of collection.
4. Transfer 1.0 mL aliquots to pre-labeled screw cap cryovials on wet ice. Do not transfer red cells 
to the vial. Cap needs to be firmly screwed tight to prevent leakage.
5. Freeze aliquots at –20 to –80°C until shipped.
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E. Specimen shipment
1. Place the samples in a shipping container following the instructions found at the CDC or the 
International Air Transport Association websites and ship on dry ice to the CDC Serum Bank 
STAT lab using an overnight, next morning delivery service. Specimens are shipped Monday–
Thursday. CDC does not accept specimens on weekends and holidays.
CDC: https://www.cdc.gov/laboratory/specimen-submission/shipping-packing.html
2. Unless other arrangements are made, all shipments are to be sent to the following address. A 
project number will be provided by CDC if an Epi-Aid investigation is initiated.
CDC Serum Bank (STAT)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1600 Clifton Road NE
Atlanta, GA 30329
“Attention: Project #”
Provide advance notice of the shipment by sending email notification to Bill Switzer (Email: 
bis3@cdc.gov) with the package tracking number when the samples ship. The email can also 
contain as an attachment the completed specimen excel file.
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Appendix C
GHOST
What is GHOST?
GHOST is an acronym which stands for Global Hepatitis Outbreak and Surveillance Technology. 
The GHOST application, developed by the Division of Viral Hepatitis, CDC, integrates molecular, 
bioinformatics, and information technologies to detect HCV transmission and identify transmission 
networks. GHOST enables state and public health laboratories to independently conduct sustainable, 
real-time HCV molecular surveillance. Real-time molecular surveillance can be used to support 
outbreak response, investigations of endemic HCV transmission among populations at high risk, 
“cure-as-prevention,” and other strategies to stop HCV transmission. 
How can GHOST be used to identify transmission links?
GHOST enables health departments and public health laboratories to conduct molecular surveillance 
and outbreak investigation by automating data processing—from raw NGS reads to the visualization 
of transmission networks. The output of GHOST is a graphic display of cases that are likely linked  
by transmission.
State public health laboratories and detection of HCV transmission networks 
State public health laboratories equipped with NGS can conduct independent outbreak investigations 
and identification of transmission networks using GHOST. The laboratory protocol and bioinformatics 
tools for automatically detecting HCV transmission networks from NGS data are available at https://
webappx.cdc.gov/GHOST/. 
GHOST users must be authenticated to have access to the website. CDC provides hands-on  
laboratory training at GHOST workshops announced via the Association of Public Health 
Laboratories. All participants of GHOST workshops receive the necessary documentation and access 
to the GHOST website. Users may request contact information for GHOST authentication through 
the Division of Viral Hepatitis at CDC or the Association of Public Health Laboratories or by emailing 
GHOST@cdc.gov. Access is granted upon completion of workshop training or after completion of 
performance testing.
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Appendix D
Indiana State management of an outbreak response
Multi-agency coordination
In response to emergencies that require the support of multiple agencies and jurisdictions, the 
State of Indiana and the Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) utilize the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s National Incident Management System and National Response Framework 
(https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/
National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf). While commonly used during natural disaster response, 
these guidelines are designed to work for all types of hazards, and were central to Indiana’s public 
health response to the 2015 HIV/HCV outbreak among PWID in Scott County. In order to effectively 
manage efforts of a multi-agency coordination system, the State of Indiana adapted its planning and 
response capability based upon the following operational constructs:
Executive Policy Group 
Emergencies and disasters can produce issues which require prompt decisions to serve both  
short- and long-term emergency management needs. At times, these decisions require a high level  
of authority and leadership to work through governmental issues, state law and jurisdictional  
impacts. In order to ensure these decisions are made effectively, an Executive Policy Group is 
established to address issues which concern the safety and welfare of Indiana residents, property,  
and the environment.
The composition of the group consists of stakeholders with the authority to make policy-related 
decisions, but varies depending upon the type, size, and complexity of the event. These  
stakeholders may include, but are not limited to representatives from Indiana Department of 
Homeland Security, the Governor’s office, Legislators, State Department of Health, Indiana National 
Guard, Indiana Department of Transportation, Indiana Department of Natural Resources, and the 
Indiana State Police. 
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) 
The ESF structure used in the State of Indiana reflects the structure defined in the National Response 
Framework. An ESF is the grouping of governmental and some private sector capabilities into an 
organizational structure used to respond to an emergency event. Each ESF provides resources and 
services in their specialty area to support the response. 
There are 15 ESFs within the National Response Framework including ESF #8—Public Health and 
Medical Services. The Indiana State Department of Health is the primary agency for the Indiana ESF 
#8. Per the Indiana Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the primary mission of the Indiana 
ESF #8 is to provide resources and personnel to support local jurisdictions to ensure the health and 
welfare of their residents, before, during, and after emergency or disaster events. ESF #8 provides 
assistance on public health issues necessary to protect the community and its citizens including 
mass casualty and fatality management, mental health services, medical supplies management and 
distribution, immunizations, epidemiological surveillance, laboratory services, environmental health, 
food safety, and long-term care.
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State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
The Indiana State EOC is the physical location where multi-agency coordination occurs and is 
managed by Indiana Department of Homeland Security. The purpose of the State EOC is to provide 
a central coordination hub for the support of local, district and state needs. The State EOC can 
be configured to expand or contract, as necessary, to respond to the different levels of incidents 
requiring state assistance.
Organization and structure
The Indiana State Department of Health may act as the lead response agency during public health 
emergencies, disease outbreaks, or other public health and medical driven emergencies. Figure D-1 
represents a simplified organizational chart showing the State response structure with the ISDH as 
the lead response agency.
Figure D‑1 Outbreak organizational chart with  
Indiana State Department of Health as the lead response agency
ISDH command structure
As the lead agency or support agency to a response, the ISDH implements a command structure to 
manage the response consistent with the National Incident Management System principles of the ICS. 
Figure D-2 represents a simplified organizational chart showing the ISDH response structure within 
the agency.
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Figure D‑2 Indiana State Department of Health ICS command structure
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ISDH Executive Policy Group
The ISDH Executive Policy Group is responsible for making the necessary executive decisions 
during a response. The ISDH Executive Policy Group is further responsible for communicating with 
the Indiana Governor’s Office, State Executive Policy Group, or other executive level groups as 
established. The group consists of representatives from the Indiana State Health Commissioner and 
ISDH Executive Staff, as well as the directly impacted Division Directors.
Multi-agency task force
In most public health and medical responses, there is significant involvement from external 
stakeholders representing healthcare, public health, mental health, education, and other organizations 
and agencies, including those from the local affected area. The ISDH can convene a Multi-Agency 
Task Force as a mechanism to discuss response objectives and needs with a larger group of subject 
matter experts. 
Response Manager
The Response Manager serves as the Incident Commander of the response, but is not deployed on-
scene like a traditional Incident Commander. The term Response Manager is intentionally used to 
avoid confusion with the local response Incident Commander or a state deployment locally. The 
Response Manager is responsible for working directly with the ISDH Executive Policy Group and 
Multi-Agency Task Force as established. The Response Manager typically is served by the most 
pertinent Division Director, Assistant Commissioner, State Epidemiologist, or other Executive Staff. 
The Response Manager may have an additional Deputy Response Manager as needed. In some 
complex incidents, the ISDH Preparedness division may serve this role. 
Command and General Staff
Public Information Officer: The ISDH Public Information Officer role is served by the ISDH Office of 
Public Affairs Division.
Medical & Safety Officer: This position is staffed in instances where dedicated medical and safety 
support is needed, and is usually staffed by an executive physician, nurse, or other person with 
medical and safety training.
Liaison Officer: There may exist multiple Liaison Officers performing different roles of liaisons to 
different groups. The following are examples:
State EOC & Homeland Security Liaison—Preparedness Division 
Outreach & Education Liaison—Deputy State Health Commissioner
Operations Section Chief: Ideally this role is best served by a Division Director or Manager pertinent 
to the response subject, with the ability to oversee multiple division operational tasks. In some 
complex incidents, the ISDH Preparedness division may serve this role. 
Planning Section Chief: This position is usually staffed by the ISDH Preparedness Division. The 
planning section may additionally include a Resource Unit Leader, Documentation Unit Leader, 
Situation Unit Leader, and Geographic Information System, as needed.
Logistics Section Chief: This position is usually staffed by the Preparedness Division. The Logistics 
section may include a Support Branch and Service Branch as needed.
Finance Section Chief: This position is usually staffed by the ISDH Finance Division.
Appendix D | Indiana State management of an outbreak response
Managing HIV and Hepatitis C Outbreaks Among People Who Inject Drugs—A Guide for State And Local Health Departments
91
ISDH Department Operations Center
The ISDH Department Operations Center is a physical location in which the multi-division 
coordination of the agency may take place. In most incidents, meetings and coordination occur in 
conference or virtually. However, during a large scale disaster, the Department Operations Center may 
be activated to support continuous coordination. The ISDH Department Operations Center is similar 
to the structure of the State EOC and the preceding ICS is utilized. 
ISDH multi-agency coordination
In complex incidents, multi-agency incidents, or statewide disasters the ISDH Command Structure 
plugs into the State Response structure through multiple means. The ISDH ESF-8 Representative 
will serve as the main liaison to the State EOC and the Indiana Department of Homeland Security. 
The ISDH Executive Policy Group will have representation on the State Executive Policy Group 
as established. In responses in which the ISDH is not the lead agency but a support agency, the 
ISDH will support the Indiana Department of Homeland Security or other lead agency in the 
State response. The ISDH will work directly with the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, or other ESF-8 Federal Partners throughout the response.
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2015 Scott County HIV Outbreak 
Role Title Division
Executive Policy Group Executive Staff Executive
Command Staff
Response Manager State Epidemiologist ERC
Deputy Response Manger HIV & STD Director HIV & STD
EOC Liaison Director of Planning & Response PHPER
Medical & Safety Officer Chief Medical Officer Executive
Public Information Officer Director of OPA OPA
General Staff
Operations Director of Preparedness PHPER
Planning Director of Preparedness PHPER
Finance Finance Division Finance
Local Command Staff
Incident Commander Director of LHD Preparedness PHPER
Public Information Officer Deputy Director of OPA OPA
Local Liaison Officer State Registrar Vital Records
EOC Liaison Officer Director of Planning & Response PHPER
Safety Officer Chief of Police APD
Local General Staff
Operations Director of Training & Exercise PHPER
Vital Records Group State Registrar Vital Records
Immunizations Group Immunizations Director Immunizations
Mental Health Group Director of DMHA FSSA
Insurance Group Director of DFR FSSA
Care and Treatment Deputy State Health Commissioner Executive
DIS Group Local DIS ISDH
Identification Group Regional Manager BMV
Job Referral Group Regional Manager DWD
Exchange Group LHD Preparedness SCHD
Planning Senior Planning Coordinator PHPER
Logistics Director of Logistics PHPER
Support Branch Warehouse Supervisor PHPER
Service Branch Communications Manager PHPER
Admin Forms Coordinator PHPER
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Appendix E
Compilation of guide web links 
Chapter 2
CDC-INFO https://www.cdc.gov/cdc-info/about.html
Information about Epi-Aids https://www.cdc.gov/eis/downloads/requesting-epi-aid.pdf
National Public Health Information Coalition outbreak communication guide  
https://www.nphic.org/toolkits/outbreak/item/download/3962_0ffb487900a79d136ba77b5920da168d
Example of the Tennessee Department of Health HIV and HCV Outbreak Response Plan  
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/programresources/guidance/cluster-outbreak/cdc-hiv-hcv-pwid-response-plan.pdf
Chapter 3
Secure HIV-TRACE https://secure.hivtrace.org/
Detecting, investigating, and responding to HIV transmission clusters guidance  
https://wwwdev.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/funding/announcements/ps18-1802/CDC-HIV-PS18-1802-AttachmentE-Detecting-
Investigating-and-Responding-to-HIV-Transmission-Clusters.pdf
Revised surveillance case definition for HIV infection—United States, 2014 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr6303a1.htm
Case definition of acute HCV https://www.cdc.gov/nndss/conditions/hepatitis-c-acute/
Example of the Tennessee Department of Health HIV and HCV Outbreak Response Plan 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/programresources/guidance/cluster-outbreak/cdc-hiv-hcv-pwid-response-plan.pdf
Chapter 6
Effective interventions: social network strategy of HIV testing  
https://effectiveinterventions.cdc.gov/en/HighImpactPrevention/PublicHealthStrategies/SocialNetworkStrategy.aspx 
Recommendations for partner services programs for HIV infection, syphilis, gonorrhea, and chlamydial Infection 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5709a1.htm
Effective interventions: partner services  
https://effectiveinterventions.cdc.gov/en/HighImpactPrevention/PublicHealthStrategies/PartnerServices.aspx
Emergency Management Assistance Compact website http://www.emacweb.org/
Sample completed EMAC form  
http://www.amchp.org/programsandtopics/CHILD-HEALTH/projects/newborn-screening/Documents/Template-NBS-
Req-A-section1_EMAC.pdf
Chapter 7
Implementing HIV testing in nonclinical settings: a guide for HIV testing providers  
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/testing/cdc_hiv_implementing_hiv_testing_in_nonclinical_settings.pdf
Revised guidelines for HIV counseling, testing, and referral  
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5019a1.htm
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State HIV laws, state guidelines for healthcare workers with HIV, and youth access to STI and HIV testing and 
treatment information http://hivlawandpolicy.org/state-hiv-laws
HIV testing implementation guidance for correctional settings  
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/group/cdc-hiv-correctional-settings-guidelines.pdf 
Prevention and control of infections with hepatitis viruses in correctional settings  
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5201a1.htm 
Tips and tools for providing transitional care coordination  
https://careacttarget.org/library/tools-tips-providing-transitional-care-coordination
HIV-related laws, guidelines for healthcare workers, and testing and treatment information  
http://hivlawandpolicy.org/state-hiv-laws 
Chapter 8
Laboratory testing for the diagnosis of HIV infection: updated recommendations  
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/50872
Chapter 9
Testing for HCV infection: an update of guidance for clinicians and laboratorians  
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6218a5.htm 
Chapter 10
FEMA ICS Resource Center https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/index.htm
Chapter 11
North Carolina law enforcement guide to syringe exchange programs infographic  
http://www.nchrc.org/assets/Syringe-Exchange-resources/LEO-Syringe-Exchange.pdf
Chapter 13
The National Clinician Consultation Center http://nccc.ucsf.edu/
AIDSinfo website https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/
Recommendations for HIV prevention with adults and adolescents with HIV in the U.S., 2014  
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/44064
Ryan White medical care providers locator website https://findhivcare.hrsa.gov/index.html
HRSA’s Bureau of Primary Health Care’s Health Center Program online clinic locator https://findahealthcenter.hrsa.gov/
HIV Medicine Association website http://www.hivma.org/Home.aspx
American Academy of HIV Medicine website http://aahivm.org/Default.aspx
AIDS Education and Training Center website https://aidsetc.org/about
Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program  
https://hab.hrsa.gov/about-ryan-white-hivaids-program/about-ryan-white-hivaids-program
HRSA’s Community Health Center Program https://bphc.hrsa.gov/about/
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HIV clinical care guidelines and resources  
https://hab.hrsa.gov/clinical-quality-management/clinical-care-guidelines-and-resources 
Guidelines for the use of antiretroviral agents in HIV-1-infected adults and adolescents living with HIV  
https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/contentfiles/lvguidelines/adultandadolescentgl.pdf
Guidelines for the prevention and treatment of opportunistic infections in HIV-infected adults and adolescents 
https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/guidelines/html/4/adult-and-adolescent-oi-prevention-and-treatment-guidelines/0
Compendium of evidence-based interventions and best practices for HIV prevention  
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/research/interventionresearch/compendium/index.html
Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program’s Special Projects of National Significance  
https://hab.hrsa.gov/about-ryan-white-hivaids-program/previous-spns-initiatives
Immunizations for persons living with HIV  
https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/guidelines/html/4/adult-and-adolescent-oi-prevention-and-treatment-guidelines/365/figure--
immunization
Chapter 14
Recommendations for testing, managing, and treating hepatitis C http://www.hcvguidelines.org/
Recommendations for prevention and control of hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection and HCV-related chronic disease 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr4719.pdf
American Liver Foundation online directory of listings of healthcare providers or treatment facilities for people with 
liver disorders http://hepc.liverfoundation.org/find-a-healthcare-provider/
HRSA’s Bureau of Primary Health Care’s Health Center Program online clinic locator https://findahealthcenter.hrsa.gov/
List of state Viral Hepatitis Prevention Coordinators https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/partners/hepatitiscoordslist.htm
Guidelines for the initial treatment of HCV infection  
http://www.hcvguidelines.org/full-report/initial-treatment-hcv-infection
Guidelines for the management of acute HCV infection  
http://www.hcvguidelines.org/full-report/management-acute-hcv-infection
Immunization recommendations for persons living with HCV  
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/hepa.html
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/hepb.html
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/pneumo.html
Chapter 15
The 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr2029/BILLS-114hr2029enr.pdf
Indiana State Department of Health syringe exchange program guidance for local health departments  
http://www.in.gov/isdh/files/ISDH%20SEP%20Guidance%20Version%202%200%20FINAL%20-%2010-04-2016-EC.pdf
CDC, HRSA and SAMHSA agency-specific guidance on use of federal funds for SSPs  
https://www.aids.gov/federal-resources/policies/syringe-services-programs/
North American Syringe Exchange Network website www.nasen.org
Examples of SSP models  
http://www.in.gov/isdh/files/ISDH%20SEP%20Guidance%20Version%202%200%20FINAL%20-%2010-04-2016-EC.pdf 
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Syringe services program (SSP) development and implementation guidelines for state and local health departments 
(NASTAD) https://www.nastad.org/sites/default/files/055419_NASTAD-SSP-Guidelines-August-2012_0.pdf 
Syringe distribution laws  
http://lawatlas.org/datasets/syringe-policies-laws-regulating-non-retail-distribution-of-drug-parapherna 
Resources and tools for developing and implementing SSPs  
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/risk/cdc-hiv-developing-ssp.pdf
Chapter 16
Principles of drug addiction treatment https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/podat_1.pdf
SAMHSA’s opioid treatment program directory http://dpt2.samhsa.gov/treatment/directory.aspx
ADAP coverage database https://www.nastad.org/sites/default/files/ADAP-Formulary-Database-Users-Guide-FINAL.pdf 
SAMHSA’s Behavioral Health Treatment Services Locator https://findtreatment.samhsa.gov/
SAMHSA’s medication-assisted treatment website https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment
Detoxification and substance abuse treatment http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content/SMA15-4131/SMA15-4131.pdf 
Oxford House safe housing programs (overview)  
http://www.oxfordhouse.org/userfiles/file/purpose_and_structure.php 
Therapeutic communities model of residential treatment for substance use  
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/therapeutic-communities/what-are-therapeutic-communities
Recovery-Oriented Systems of Care http://www.williamwhitepapers.com/pr/CSAT%20ROSC%20Definition.pdf
Examples of Recovery-Oriented Systems of Care  
http://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-71550_2941_4871_4877_48561-113480--,00.html 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdch/ROSC_FS-_SUD_Agency_Directors_337044_7.pdf 
https://www.dshs.texas.gov/substance-abuse/ROSC/)
Narcotics Anonymous® https://www.na.org/meetingsearch/index.php 
Cocaine Anonymous® http://www.ca-online.org/meetings/
Alcohol Anonymous® http://www.aa.org/pages/en_US/find-aa-resources 
LifeRing sober living® http://lifering.org/ 
Oxford Houses™ directory http://www.oxfordhouse.org/userfiles/file/house-directory.php 
SMART Recovery® non-abstinence based treatment program for substance use disorder  
http://www.smartrecovery.org/ 
Moderation Management® non-abstinence based treatment program for substance use disorder  
http://www.moderation.org/meetings/
Example of a facility-based recovery program http://marsproject.org/
Chapter 18
Preexposure prophylaxis for the prevention of HIV infection—2014: a clinical practice guideline  
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/23109
Brief guide for covering the cost of PrEP http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/risk/prep/cdc-hiv-paying-for-prep.pdf
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PrEP infographics, videos, fact sheets, reports, and other educational materials  
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/prep/index.html
National Clinician Consultation Center http://nccc.ucsf.edu/clinician-consultation/prep-pre-exposure-prophylaxis/
Updated guidelines for antiretroviral postexposure prophylaxis after sexual, injection drug use, or other 
nonoccupational exposure to HIV—United States, 2016 https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/38856
Updated U.S. Public Health Service guidelines for the management of occupational exposures to HIV and 
recommendations for postexposure prophylaxis https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/20711
Chapter 19
Recommendations for identification and public health management of persons with chronic hepatitis B virus 
infection https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5708a1.htm 
Appendix B
Instructions for shipping laboratory specimens to CDC  
https://www.cdc.gov/laboratory/specimen-submission/shipping-packing.html
Appendix C
Global Hepatitis Outbreak and Surveillance Technology website https://webappx.cdc.gov/GHOST/
Appendix D
National Response Framework  
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_
Framework3rd.pdf
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